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ABSTRACT 
Whilst a significant proportion of those coming through the Magistrates’ Court 
have mental health difficulties and associated social disadvantage and 
vulnerability, there would appear to insufficient resources to meet their needs.  
Eight criminal defence barristers, who received no professional training in 
mental health, were interviewed about their experience of working with these 
clients. Thematic analysis of data, from a critical realist epistemological position, 
generated two themes. “Working with clients’ mental health difficulties” 
describes how mental health is constructed, identified, and defended; the 
systemic issues that may compromise the defence; barristers’ attempts to 
mitigate harm and manage distress; and finally, barristers’ own distress.  
“Professional anxiety” captures how barristers are strained by their recognition 
of a flawed system; conflicting obligations to the court and their client; and 
pressures of poor resources, feeling very responsible, and needing to present 
an illusion of confidence.  
A discussion of these results included consideration of the potential for a 
medicalising narrative to lead to legal paternalism (subjugating the client’s 
autonomy in an attempt to act in their “best interests”); and the deprivation of 
defence options; possibly representing unintended human rights violations. 
Barristers found clients with mental health needs were particularly emotionally 
taxing, desired training to work with them, and suggested that these clients 
were vulnerable to wider discrimination and inequalities in the criminal justice 
system. Concerns were raised by the barristers’ significant risk factors for 
“burnout” (a state of psychological stress), and the implications of this for both 
their emotional well-being, and the risk of exposing their clients to financially 
driven unethical behaviour. Systemic changes, informed by clinical psychology, 
were recommended, including training for barristers. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Whilst acknowledging the underlying medicalised narrative of the terminology 
“mental health,” this has been used interchangeably with “distress” throughout 
this thesis for readability. 
“Barrister” is UK specific; “lawyer” has been used here to refer to equivalent 
roles in the US, Canada, or Australia.  
“Defence strategy” is used heuristically to refer to the barristers’ legal actions, 
as to make continuous legal distinctions would be taxing for the reader. It is 
acknowledged that use of, for example, fitness to plead proceedings is a part of 
the plea process preceding the trial, and is therefore technically and legally not 
part of the defence.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
CJS: Criminal Justice System 
MC: Magistrates’ Court 
NHS: National Health Service 
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GLOSSARY 
Bar Council – the General Council of the Bar, to give it its full title, is the Bar’s 
representative body.  
Bar Standards Board – or BSB, is the Bar’s regulatory body. 
Barrister – a member of the Bar of England and Wales. 
Call – the ceremony whereby you become a barrister. 
Chambers – a group of barristers in independent practice who have joined 
together to share the costs of practising.  
CPS – Crown Prosecution Service. Government body responsible for the 
prosecution of criminal offences in England and Wales. 
Junior – a barrister not yet appointed silk. Note: older juniors are known as 
senior juniors. 
Pupillage – the year of training undertaken after Bar school and before tenancy. 
Adapted from Chambers Student (2014) 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Mental health and the criminal justice system (CJS) are inherently, and 
reciprocally, linked (Erickson & Erickson, 2008).  A significant proportion of 
those coming through the CJS have mental health difficulties, and associated 
social disadvantage and vulnerability (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002). Historically, 
two competing narratives have shaped the discourse around those who are 
both distressed and socially deviant: medicalisation, and criminalisation; or 
more brutally: mad or bad? The legal context that enables criminalisation will be 
examined, as will the reasons why medicalisation might pose a problematic 
alternative. Whilst providing a background to the thesis that is important in its 
own right, these constructs are also proposed as potentially informing the 
thinking and associated defence strategies of criminal defence barristers, the 
focus of this research. 
I will discuss systemic failures in the CJS, and how wider issues of poor 
training, patchy interagency working, and a dearth of adequate procedures, are 
paralleled within the Magistrates’ Court (MC). Relevant policy, such as 
discriminatory practices towards vulnerable defendants, will be considered.  
Reform of the CJS is a current political issue: I will outline the current interest in 
expansion and standardisation of Liaison and Diversion schemes (Sainsbury 
Centre for Mental Health, 2009), which siphon defendants into the mental health 
system. I will suggest that this may represent a process of medicalisation, which 
could potentially pose a new set of problems.  
Barristers have a crucial role in the MC, responsible for forming and presenting 
their client’s defence; some of these legal processes will be outlined. Some 
concerning aspects of their emotional and professional context will be 
described, including a process of professional socialisation that may encourage 
the suppression of emotion, an overload of work, experiences of role conflict; 
and the potential for these factors to lead to the state of psychological stress 
labelled as “burnout”. It is suggested that whilst the work is inherently 
demanding, the specific challenges posed by clients with mental health 
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difficulties, combined with a pressured and potentially discriminatory system, 
may result in particular strain for barristers. 
Whilst suggesting the system is ill set-up to meet defendants’ needs, it will be 
argued that barristers are equally ill-resourced to do so. The reasons for this, 
including poor professional guidance and a lack of mandatory training, will be 
explored; as will the potential implications of poorer outcomes for their clients, 
and harm to barristers’ emotional welfare.  
Finally, I will explain the relevance of this research to clinical psychology, linking 
to both the wellbeing of defendants and barristers, and the human rights 
implications of a systematic disadvantage to those with mental health 
difficulties. 
 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH: EXCLUSIONS 
Whilst injustices in the CJS are wide-ranging, exclusions were necessary for 
reasons of focus and depth within a limited piece of research. The literature 
review and interview questions therefore focus on “mental health,” or 
“psychological distress.” This study does not explicitly examine the experience 
of those with a history of neurodevelopmental disability or trauma, including 
learning disabilities; or substance misuse; these groups are also 
overrepresented within the CJS (Children’s Commissioner, 2012; Hartwell, 
2004; Talbot & Riley, 2007). Differentiating on diagnostic lines is problematic 
from a psychological perspective (Boyle, 2007), and so specific diagnostic 
exclusions were not made; moreover as an exploratory study, to an extent what 
was brought to the interviews was defined by the barristers themselves. 
Solicitors, who perform a similar role to barristers in this context, were also not 
part of the study. 
 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED  
Whilst this research is framed as an investigation into psychological distress, 
constructions of distress as a “mental health difficulty” or “mental health need” 
within the CJS will be considered. Whilst the validity of this construct is debated, 
using this construct as a label can have real implications for defendants and is 
therefore of interest (illustratively, a psychiatric assessment that diagnoses a 
defendant with depression could provide mitigation for sentencing).  This thesis 
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will refer to “mental health difficulties” or “needs” throughout as a heuristic for a 
group of people who experience such distress that their wellbeing or functioning 
is inhibited, and whom through a psychiatric lens, may be referred to as having 
met diagnostic criteria for so-called mental illnesses (Johnstone, 2011). 
Importantly, since mental health is not routinely assessed in the MC (Khanom, 
Samele, & Rutherford, 2009), barristers are likely to come across many clients 
in great distress and who would meet such criteria, but who may never have 
been given a psychiatric diagnosis.  
This research therefore sets out to consider how barristers work with such 
individuals, who may meet diagnostic criteria for a mental health difficulty, but 
who may or may not actually have been diagnosed. It is therefore being 
considered at one-step-removed, with mental health viewed through the lens of 
the barristers’ constructions, rather than something defined or measured in a 
more quantitative way. This research is furthermore concerned more loosely 
with “psychological distress”: that is, distress arising from the heightened 
emotional environment of the courtroom. How do barristers manage this 
distress, and given the likely lack of diagnostic labels attached to their clients, 
how do they differentiate it from a mental health difficulty? Furthermore, an 
unexpected finding of this research indicated that barristers may themselves be 
distressed, which will also be discussed. 
Whilst the title reflects this dual understanding of distress: clients’ longstanding 
difficulties that could be labelled as a mental health problem, as well as both 
barristers’ and defendants’ more situational distress, this thesis places a far 
greater emphasis on understanding the former issue, reflected in the use of 
“mental health” throughout. The reader may question the use of such a title as 
opposed to something explicitly naming mental health. However, this decision 
has been informed by the critical realist epistemological position of the work. 
Titles do not afford sufficient space for deconstruction, and it was therefore 
decided that the use of “mental health” in such a context would be unjustifiably 
reifying of the construct. It was for these reasons that “psychological distress” 
was used instead. 
Finally, “courtroom process” is used here to refer to the different stages of the 
trial, and considers how barristers’ ideas about mental health may influence the 
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legal processes at each stage. The barristers’ involvement is generally very 
short for each client, and aside from the actual representation of the client in 
court, will frequently involve only a brief meeting shortly before the trial starts, 
unless there are complicating factors such as adjournments (Morison & Leith, 
1992).The courtroom process in relation to barristers’ involvement has been 
conceptualised as: pre-trial, during the trial, and post-trial outcomes. Pre-trial 
refers to barristers’ prior knowledge and experience of clients with mental health 
difficulties, and how they construct mental health; during the trial refers to how 
barristers’ work with their clients’ distress and the specific legal actions they 
may take to defend these clients with mental health difficulties, and post-trial 
refers to how barristers make sense of the outcomes for these clients.  
 SEARCH STRATEGY 
Due to the extensive breadth of the relevant literature, a narrative rather than 
systematic search strategy was employed.  This included searching legal and 
psychology databases, government policies, key journals, and the references of 
relevant papers. In order to get the most up-to-date policy documents, 
professionals named on key policy documents were contacted for suggestions 
for further references. 
Papers were considered from any time frame. Databases included: HeinOnline 
(on 15.10.13), EBSCO (15.10.13), Psychinfo (28.10.13), Science Direct 
(28.10.13), and Google Scholar (11.13.14); search terms were as wide as 
possible and included: ((mental health OR mental illness OR stigma OR mental 
disorders OR psychiatric symptoms OR personality disorders) AND (barristers 
OR lawyers OR attorney OR criminal defence OR court case OR magistrates 
OR criminal responsibility)). Searches were repeated on 20.04.15.  
A review of this literature follows. 
1.2 CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH 
This literature review begins with some discussion of how mental health has 
historically been constructed within the CJS. Given the vast nature of this 
subject, this will necessarily be a summary, provided to orient the reader to an 
important context to the work. The implications for the barristers in this study will 
also be considered.  
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 MAD OR BAD: TO MEDICALISE, OR CRIMINALISE? 
Mental health is inherently, and reciprocally, linked to the CJS (Erickson & 
Erickson, 2008). Following deinstitutionalisation, those who had formerly been 
incarcerated in asylums were not adequately supported by community care. 
Many became homeless due to a number of factors, including a lack of or 
unwillingness to accept treatment, and experimentation with alcohol and drugs; 
and thus ended up in the CJS (Erickson & Erickson, 2008).  A reduction in the 
hospital population has been found to correlate to a corresponding increase in 
the prison population (Palermo, Smith, & Liska, 1991). This has been termed 
the balloon effect: you push in one part of the balloon, and it will bulge out 
elsewhere (Palermo et al., 1991). Mental health was thus increasingly 
criminalised, with a shift from a treatment to a punishment paradigm, with 
prisons functioning as de facto asylums (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). Harcourt 
(2006) argues this is a continuity of confinement, with the socially deviant simply 
confined in jails instead of hospitals.  
An alternative model of social control is to medicalise deviancy: through this 
lens, evil and immoral acts are instead the product of sickness. While seemingly 
a more humanitarian and optimistic perspective, Szasz (Ennis & Szasz, 1972) 
argues this depoliticises what is essentially a moral judgement; and that what is 
described as “good health” simply represents an adjustment to the status quo. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this debate in detail, but it is worth 
briefly sketching some of the consequences of medicalisation, as these may be 
relevant to the barristers in this study.  
Arguably, narratives of distress become dominated by medical authority, 
meaning that only professionals are empowered to discuss them (Peter & 
Schneider, 1992). Medicalisation provides only a partial excuse, leading to 
confusion and the dislocation of responsibility for deviant behaviour.  This 
dislocated responsibility leads to the reduction in status of medicalised 
individuals, as the not-responsible-and-sick become dependent on the 
responsible-and-well (Peter & Schneider, 1992). Finally, such ambiguity about 
culpability jars against the clear and definite nature of the law, discussed below. 
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 CONSTRUCTION OF MENTAL HEALTH WITHIN THE CJS 
Psychiatric and legal constructions of mental health are so different as to 
essentially be opposing. The law determines blameworthiness with reference to 
free will, based on a philosophical tradition of moral reasoning and religious 
conceptions of good and evil. Guilt means a criminal act has been committed 
freely and deliberately; it is thus underpinned by values of punishment and 
retribution (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). 
In tension with this, the behavioural sciences, including psychology, sit within a 
social world that is very differently constructed. Rather than a moral or 
philosophical tradition, the scientific perspective is empirical and deterministic. 
Since free will is not measurable, it has no explanatory value and is thus 
discarded; instead causal explanations are favoured based upon psychological, 
social, societal, and biological explanations. Rather than punishment, a 
medicalised perspective on the treatment of offenders is more utilitarian, based 
upon prevention and rehabilitation (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). A medicalised 
perspective on distress has gained social currency in recent years (Peter & 
Schneider, 1992) and has been backed by government initiatives such as the 
“Time to Change” campaign (Henderson et al., 2012). 
Given these very different constructions, it is hardly surprising to find that 
mental health difficulties do not sit well within a legal framework. The law allows 
for the fact that those with “mental disorder” may not be fully responsible for 
their actions (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010), but notions of rationality, 
autonomy and the fluctuating nature of mental health add to a very complex 
construction of responsibility  (Hall, Miraglia, & Li-Wen, 2011). Criminal 
responsibility can only be fully abdicated by use of the “insanity defence;” which 
is only applicable to a tiny proportion of defendants in the Crown Court1. Whilst 
technically admissible at the MC, the reality for most defendants is that mental 
health difficulties do not constitute a defence in themselves and can only be 
taken into consideration as mitigation. Emotional, social and societal factors, 
and to a large extent contact with reality at the time of the offence, are not 
                                            
1 Approximately 30 pleaded successfully each year (The Law Commission, 2012) 
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considered in determining “guilt;” as these are irrelevant to the legal constructs 
of moral agency and reasoning.  
The tension between legal and psychiatric constructions of mental health, and 
their underlying philosophical positions, has led to considerable and 
controversial debate. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to outline these 
debates in depth, the example of personality disorder may help to illustrate how 
these play out in practice. Personality disorder can be considered a mental 
disorder as defined by the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and 
from this perspective could be used in the defence of a crime, citing reduced 
responsibility as a mitigating factor. Yet, personality disorder is considered to be 
life-long, has been claimed to be untreatable, and many if not most of the prison 
population may meet diagnostic criteria (Hall et al., 2001), and therefore to grant 
diminished responsibility to these individuals would cause severe disruption to 
the CJS. Furthermore as discussed earlier, to medicalise individuals by claiming 
they offend because they are unwell also leads to confusing questions about 
the nature of responsibility, and human autonomy (Peter & Schneider, 1992). 
Evidently, there is fertile ground for disagreement and debate when it comes to 
dealing with mental health within the CJS. How, then, do barristers make sense 
of these issues? 
 BARRISTERS’ CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH 
This thesis sets out to consider the barristers’ experience of working with clients 
with so-called mental health difficulties.  Research suggests that constructions 
of mental health will have a bearing on how barristers think about, and work 
with, their clients with mental health needs (Laberge & Morin, 1998). Barristers 
work within a system that criminalises deviancy, yet live in a cultural context that 
privileges medicalised explanations. To date, no research has attempted to 
understand how barristers make sense of these competing narratives; it will 
therefore be examined from an exploratory angle by this thesis. 
Having outlined some of the historical medical and legal narratives that 
construct mental health within the courtroom, the introduction now moves on to 
consider further important contextual influences on barristers’ experience, such 
as the structure of the CJS and their training and professional experiences. The 
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issue of the construction of mental health and related debates within the CJS 
will, however, be returned to later in “implications for defendants with mental 
health needs,” so as to relate these issues more directly to the thesis topic, the 
barristers’ experience. Some speculation will be offered as to how barristers 
may think about these issues, and the possible implications for defendants.   
1.3  THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (CJS) 
The great number of individuals with mental health needs within the CJS has 
been recognised but thus far poorly researched, or tackled. What attempts there 
have been at either will be presented, as will issues related to the current 
political context of the MC.  
 ORIENTATION TO THE CJS 
All criminal cases begin in the MC. More serious crimes, such as murder2, will 
proceed to the Crown court; but vast majority (95%) of cases are tried here. 
Some 2 million cases per year come through MCs, of which two thirds are 
motoring offences, with examples of the remainder including: theft, violence 
against the person, drug offences, and criminal damage (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2006). As will be discussed, many MC offences might be 
differently conceptualised as a “symptom” of a mental health problem, for 
example, drug addiction; or as an understandable action in a life of social 
exclusion, deprivation, and consequent psychological distress. Criminal defence 
barristers work in both the Crown court, and the MC; they are referred to as 
“junior” barristers until they reach the senior position of “Queen’s Counsel”, 
typically only once more experienced and working in the Crown court. 
Consequentially, all participants in this study were junior barristers. 
It is been claimed elsewhere that the MC was established, and continues to 
function, by eroding the due process of law: that is, replacing a trial by jury with 
a trial heard only by Magistrates (Winn, 1986). Instead of seeking to serve 
justice, it merely operates as the most efficient means of crime and social 
control (Winn, 1986). It will be suggested that the most vulnerable in our society 
are at most risk of discrimination and injustice from the MC, due to a toxic 
                                            
2 A defendant may also elect to be tried in the Crown Court 
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combination of prosecution of petty crime, a drive to process defendants as 
quickly as possible, and the particular pressures on defence barristers. Unlike 
the Crown court, mental health concerns are not routinely screened, and are 
much less likely to be identified (Khanom et al., 2009). For these reasons, the 
focus of this study is the MC, not the Crown Court. 
 NUMBERS OF DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS 
WITHIN THE CJS 
Determining exactly how many defendants have mental health needs is 
problematic. Mental health has historically been neglected within the CJS, 
which is reflected in the dearth of epidemiological mental health research in all 
areas of the system. Mental health is not routinely measured by the Ministry of 
Justice (Department of Health, 2009), and it is accordingly difficult to reach a 
useful estimate of the level of mental health needs. Somewhat outdated now, 
the most comprehensive evidence comes from a study of psychiatric morbidity 
in prisoners (Singleton, Meltzer, & Gatward, 1998). This indicated that over 90% 
of male and female prisoners met criteria for one of the five disorders studied 
(psychosis, neurosis, personality disorder, and drug and alcohol dependence), 
with over 80% meeting criteria for two or more.  
Whilst there has been no research of this quality since, more recent attempts to 
collate information from different sections of the system suggest that a 
significant proportion (if not a majority) of offenders have mental health needs 
(Durkan, 2009). For example, a survey of newly sentenced prisoners found 10% 
met criteria for a psychotic disorder and 61% a personality disorder (Stewart, 
2008); and there continues to be high levels of suicide and self-harm in prisons, 
compared to the general population (Ministry of Justice, 2015).  
Moreover, to deconstruct the terminology somewhat, it could be considered 
somewhat disingenuous to dichotomise these issues in this way: a group with 
mental health needs, and a group that offend. Arguably, these labels serve to 
obscure shared contextual factors, such as social disadvantage and exclusion. 
For example, the development of difficulties diagnosed as “mental health” is 
associated with being a lone parent, unemployed, disability and illness, and 
leaving school early (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004); paralleling this, offending 
10 
 
behaviour is associated with high levels of family, educational, occupational, 
and health disadvantage (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002). Research suggests that 
the relationship between both mental health diagnosis and offending behaviour, 
and social exclusion, is reciprocal and reinforcing (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002), 
with individuals with mental health labels in the CJS perhaps facing a “double 
discrimination” (Department of Health, 2009).  
As will be discussed, perhaps treating mental health difficulties in the CJS 
rather misses the point, with preventative work to address inequalities a more 
useful method of reducing distress. However, these are huge issues, beyond 
the remit of this thesis. It is therefore acknowledged that the isolation of mental 
health needs is a construction, and a somewhat problematic one at that; but the 
use of these labels have real-world implications for defendants in the CJS. A 
deprived and unhappy life offers little in the way of legal defence, whereas a 
mental health diagnosis can be submitted as mitigating evidence. “Mental 
health” is therefore used throughout from a critical realist epistemological 
position: a socially constructed label, but one with powerful implications for an 
individual’s material reality. This will be explored further in the Methods and 
Discussion chapters.   
 SYSTEMIC FAILURES IN THE CJS 
Concerns about how people with mental health needs are treated within the 
CJS are serious and system-wide. An independent report was commissioned in 
2013, following a number of tragic deaths in police custody (Adebowale, 2013). 
It found that throughout the system, vulnerable individuals are routinely met with 
stigma, ignorance, and a lack of resources. Mental health issues are either not 
acknowledged or met with discrimination, interagency working and 
communication is poor, and procedures to protect the vulnerable are not 
followed. These systemic failings have been directly linked to a number of 
preventable injuries and deaths (Adebowale, 2013), and it will be suggested 
here that defendants in the MC are likely to suffer from these issues. 
This research has been written at a time of great systemic flux, with various 
cross-departmental initiatives considering how to better meet the needs of 
people with mental health difficulties within the CJS (e.g Durkan, 2009; May, 
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2014). It is encouraging that there is recognition of these systemic failures and a 
drive to completely overhaul the current system. However, such changes are in 
their infancy, and exist in tension with other political agendas. The current 
interest in diverting defendants with mental health needs away from the CJS will 
be presented from a critical perspective; as will concerns about safeguarding 
the vulnerability of these clients, and the implication for their human rights. 
Some current political issues in the MC will now be discussed. 
 LIAISON AND DIVERSION SCHEMES 
Liaison and Diversion schemes were created in the 1980s, aiming to promote 
better liaison between the CJS and health services, and to “divert” more of 
those with mental health needs from the former to the latter (Durkan, 2009). 
Provision and scope substantially vary; typically there is little good-quality 
research to draw upon, but probably less than half of all courts England and 
Wales had any coverage in 2009 (Durkan, 2009). In 2010, a new “National 
Liaison and Diversion Development Programme,” was announced by the 
government, with £50 million funding and a commitment to all areas having a 
fully functioning service by 2017 (The Stationery Office, 2010). 
Whilst almost universally regarded as a “good thing” (Offender Health Research 
Network, 2011, pp 15), there is very limited research into the effectiveness of 
Liaison and Diversion schemes. What has been published tends to focus on 
immediate, rather than long-term outcomes (for a review of services and 
outcomes, see: Offender Health Research Network, 2011). There is little 
examination of what constitutes a good outcome and the assumptions 
underlying this. Whilst some services take a psychosocial approach, e.g. 
increasing employment opportunities, others may run to a more medical model 
(Durkan, 2009). This may involve the separation of “mental illness” from the 
social context in which this was established. In other words, management and 
treatment of the so-called symptoms is sought, rather than addressing the 
material disadvantage and social exclusion that may have precipitated both the 
distress, and the criminal behaviour, in the first place.  
Whilst it is of course important to ensure that distressed individuals have 
adequate access to services, arguably, merely increasing referrals to diversion 
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services may not be the tidy solution it seems. Indeed, given this group is likely 
to come flagged as high-risk, they potentially merely face different sanctions 
and coercion within a patriarchal mental health system: for example, forcibly 
medicated as part of a “mental health treatment requirement” (Sainsbury Centre 
for Mental Health, 2009). As suggested above by the theory on medicalisation, 
diversion services may simply reproduce the social control function of the CJS, 
albeit sanitised in the language of “treatment.” 
The little empirical evidence available lends some support to this possibility: a 
one-year prospective study of referrals to a new psychiatric diversion scheme 
led to 60% of referrals being admitted to hospital, and accounted for 12.8% of 
the total sections under s37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in England over the 
period of study, despite only serving a population of 500,000 (James & Harlow, 
2000). Likewise, a national survey returned by 64 schemes reported that courts 
followed recommendations to divert to hospital, but were less likely to accept 
recommendations for community treatment (NACRO, 2005).  
Previous research appears to assume that that increased referrals to mental 
health services is necessarily the best outcome for these individuals; (e.g. 
Covarrubias, 2008, Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2009; Conduit & 
Heseltine, 2005). However, due to the theoretical issues of medicalisation 
discussed earlier, and the worrying reality of increasing coercion suggested by 
the figures above, this is not an assumption that I share. This research was thus 
undertaken from an explicitly neutral position: rather than considering how to 
increase referrals, it merely aims to examine how the CJS currently intersects 
with mental health services, and the barrister’s role in negotiating this.  
 VULNERABLE DEFENDANTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Defendants with mental health needs have recently been constructed as 
“vulnerable,” with thought given to their ability to take part in the legal process 
(Talbot, 2012). As will later be discussed, the vast majority of defendants with 
mental health needs will be deemed fit to stand trial, including those whose 
difficulties may well affect their ability to fully participate. For example: hearing 
voices, fear, or difficulties communicating may make the already stressful 
environment of the courtroom intolerable and potentially incomprehensible.   
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However, vulnerable defendants are not currently afforded the same legal rights 
as vulnerable witnesses, for example, the use of an intermediary to help them to 
understand proceedings. Whilst this has recently been recognised as unfair, 
and changes have been recommended (Talbot, 2012), a timeframe for 
implementing these legal changes has not been forthcoming.  Meanwhile, 
vulnerable defendants continue to go through the MC, without statutory 
provision to help them comprehend the process.  
It is difficult to overstate the implications of this. Defendants with mental health 
difficulties are protected by the Equality Act (2010) under which the courts have 
a duty to eliminate unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability, and 
promote equality. By not providing protection for these clients, they are arguably 
suffering institutional discrimination. Moreover, the defendant’s ability to 
effectively participate in court proceedings, and to have a fair trial, may be 
compromised. This is protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1950). Clients with mental health needs in the MC are therefore 
at risk of institutional discrimination, and a violation of their human rights, by 
virtue of an inability to comprehend and participate in their trial.  
 POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT 
Yet as a parallel process to the political rhetoric of reform, diversion, and 
investment, MCs have become ever-more target driven, focussed on 
“processing” defendants rather than, arguably, giving them a fair trial 
(Hungerford-Welch, 2010). Under this agenda, the priority is to decrease cost 
by increased processing speed, aiming for an increase in guilty pleas, and a 
reduction in both the quantity and time length of hearings (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2006)  
The current context of the MC is therefore incredibly pressurised, and likely to 
be at odds with the needs of those with mental health difficulties. As discussed 
later, there are a number of legal processes that allow mental health to be taken 
into account; almost all of which are likely to delay proceedings, and potentially 
create resistance from the Court. There is evidence to suggest that courtroom 
professionals have internalised this agenda and consider delivering “simple 
speedy summary justice” their priority, with consideration of mental health 
14 
 
needs an interference in this process (Khanom et al., 2009). Defendants with 
mental health difficulties may face the double jeopardy of having both 
“offended,” and holding a stigmatised diagnostic label (Department of Health, 
2009). Due to Magistrates’ “fused powers,” negotiation of adjournments and 
other measures may necessitate a disclosure of mental health difficulties to the 
court, regardless of whether or not this forms part of the defence, thereby 
potentially biasing the case.  
Thus, whilst there is currently an important and substantive move to 
decriminalise defendants with mental health needs, afford them equal rights so 
that they can effectively partake in the CJS, and liaise better with NHS mental 
health services; these changes are in their infancy, and in opposition to other 
pressures on MCs. How, then, do barristers negotiate these systems when 
working with clients with mental health needs?  
1.4 THE COURTROOM PROCESS 
To answer this question, we return to the research question and begin to 
consider the courtroom process as it relates to barristers. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the courtroom process has been conceptualised chronologically, as 
relating to pre-trial, during the trial, and outcomes of the trial. The following 
literature therefore reviews the emotional and professional context that 
barristers may bring to the trial and the potential ways they may construct 
mental health, the actions that they may take during the trial, and considers 
potential implications of these factors on the outcomes for defendants. The 
reader should note that the following subsections are, however, ordered for 
readability rather than reflecting this chronological conceptualisation.   
 LEGAL CONTEXT 
Criminal defence barristers, referred to simply as “barristers” for readability, are 
responsible for advocating on behalf of their clients in the MC. Thus they 
occupy a pivotal role for their client, in both preparing their defence, and as the 
advocate who will stand alongside them during their day in court (Elliott & 
Quinn, 2013).  
The interplay between the law and mental health, and the barrister’s role in 
negotiating this, is hugely complex; comprehensively detailing this legal process 
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is beyond the remit of this thesis. However, a sense of barristers’ legal 
opportunities and responsibilities is useful context to the research. Table 2 
provides an overview of potential legal processes in the MC that specifically 
relate to mental health, and barristers’ associated responsibilities for these. 
Besides the very limited application of the insanity defence described earlier, 
mental health can be considered in relation to: the prosecution pre-trial, fitness 
to plead, occasionally used as a defence in its own right, and submitted as 
mitigating evidence for the defence. Details of these processes are provided in 
the table.
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Table 2: Legal processes in the Magistrates’ Court that relate to mental health, and barristers’ associated responsibilities 
 
 
Stage of 
process 
Specific legal process re: 
mental health 
Possible 
outcomes 
Barristers’ responsibilities  
Pre-trial The Crown Prosecution 
Service decides whether to 
pursue a case by (i) 
considering whether there is 
sufficient evidence; and (ii) 
weighing up where the 
public interest lies, including 
considering the client’s 
mental health  
Either the 
matter 
proceeds to 
trial or is 
discontinued 
by the CPS 
- Receive pre-trial information 
- Contact / negotiate with the CPS to advocate that the case is 
discontinued on public interest grounds 
Receive 
instructions 
from the 
client   
  - Consider client’s case 
- Decide whether there is any question of the client being unfit to 
plead 
- Advise client regarding likelihood of acquittal / credit given for an 
early guilty plea  
- Take instructions: whether client wishes to plead guilty or not 
guilty 
- Discuss client’s mental health needs, where appropriate 
- Advise on whether to choose trial by magistrate or jury, where 
appropriate 
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Stage of 
process 
Specific legal process re: 
mental health 
Possible outcomes Barristers’ responsibilities  
Enter a 
plea (plea 
before 
venue) 
 A not guilty plea is entered: the case will proceed 
to trial in the Magistrates Court (or be transferred 
to the Crown Court for more serious offences or 
where the Defendant chooses to be tried by a 
jury)  
- Entering the plea or 
otherwise as below: 
 A guilty plea is entered: the case will go to 
sentencing 
 
Ask for an adjournment to 
allow further time to, for 
example, receive further 
instructions / request a 
psychiatric assessment 
etc. 
The Magistrates can decide whether or not to 
grant this 
- Advocate this for the client, 
with or without the disclosure 
of mental health needs to the 
court. 
Fitness to Plead: the client 
could be assessed for 
capacity to understand the 
trial, by a healthcare 
professional such as a 
doctor 
The client could be found unfit to plead. The trial 
then rests on whether the client “did the act” (a 
lesser burden of proof); if so, they may then be 
sentenced to a hospital  
- If no previous professional 
has done so (e.g. solicitor), the 
barrister must first notice there 
is a problem  
- Arrange for a medical 
assessment 
Request report from 
mental health professional 
(including psychiatric 
report) 
The trial could be stopped and the client instead 
referred onto services or hospital;  the 
recommendations could also be taken into 
account when sentencing  
- Request report (from e.g. the 
local liaison and diversion 
scheme, or a psychiatric 
assessment if this is not 
available).  
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Stage of 
process 
Specific legal process re: 
mental health 
Possible outcomes Barristers’ responsibilities  
Enter a 
plea (plea 
before 
venue) 
Referral to Liaison and 
Diversion Schemes 
Where available, these can divert clients from the 
trial process to mental health services. This 
includes use of compulsory Hospital Orders under 
the Mental Health Act 1983. Assessments can be 
taken into account when sentencing 
- Refer the client (N.B. 
barristers are not exclusively 
responsible for this, but 
arguably could do so if other 
professional groups have not: 
see section on Liaison and 
Diversion Schemes above). 
Otherwise introduce 
mental health as a 
mitigating factor for 
sentencing 
In addition to the specific actions above, 
barristers can present mental health needs as 
mitigating factors when sentencing, potentially 
leading to a more lenient, or treatment-focussed 
outcome (e.g. Mental Health Treatment 
Requirement community order).  
- Whilst the defendant’s mental 
health will be routinely 
assessed by probation at the 
point of sentencing, the 
barrister can also advocate for 
this to be taken into account. 
Information adapted from: Crown Prosecution Service (2010), Morison & Leith (1992), Rethink Mental Illness (2012) and 
Rethink Mental Illness (2013).3 
                                            
3 N.B. this table is intended as a guide to the various decision points made by barristers, and potential opportunities and failures to take mental health 
needs into account. Therefore whilst the illustrative outcomes are accurate, the exact legal mechanisms have been simplified. 
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If convicted, barristers may be responsible for submitting any mental health 
needs in mitigation. Other responsibilities relate to the process of the trial itself, 
such as giving advice (discussed later), requesting psychiatric reports, referring 
to liaison and diversion schemes, and negotiating adjournments. As stated, due 
to the limitations of a thesis that must remain clinically-oriented, the above 
cannot be considered in depth. Dropping the case on public interest grounds, 
and fitness to plead proceedings are, however, particularly relevant to this 
research. These actions are briefly outlined below. 
Theoretically, barristers can ask the prosecution to drop a case on public 
interest grounds, meaning that it will never come to court. In practice, however, 
very few cases are dropped by the CPS; for example in 2011-12, only 2.3% of 
post-charge decisions were made to drop cases on public interest grounds 
(Sosa, 2012). . 
Whilst there is a two stage statutory process in the Crown Court for considering 
the fitness of a defendant to plead, there is no equivalent in the MC.  If a 
defendant is suffering a treatable mental disorder [sic] (as defined by S.1 of the 
Mental Health Act) then, having found that a defendant committed the act or 
omission charged with, the Magistrates can impose a hospital or guardianship 
order instead of a criminal penalty. This is generally considered to be a poor 
outcome for everyone. A lesser burden of proof is required to convict the 
defendant (as the prosecution does not have to prove intent), and whilst the 
defendant may be acquitted, they also risk an indeterminate hospital order. 
Furthermore, victims are potentially deprived of an admittance of guilt and a 
normal conviction, and defendants are deprived of a fair chance to participate in 
their trial (Law Commission, 2013). If the defendant does not meet this criteria, 
barristers can apply for a stay of proceedings on the basis that the defendant is 
unable to participate effectively and cannot therefore have a fair trial; but there 
is no guarantee that this will be accepted.  
1.5 BARRISTERS’ EMOTIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT 
Arguably then, to provide the most rigorous defence, Barristers have to consider 
mental health needs throughout the entire courtroom process. Having outlined 
some of the legal context, the emotional and professional context will be 
20 
 
discussed, followed by a consideration of potential implications of these issues 
on clients with mental health needs.  
 PROFESSIONAL SOCIALISATION 
Barristers are members of “the Bar:” an arcane world, reflected in its many 
shibboleths (necessarily explained here only briefly: see glossary of terms). An 
exceptionally competitive career path, candidates must complete both an 
undergraduate degree in Law (or first degree and specified conversion course), 
and a one-year practitioner training course before being “called to the Bar.” 
They then must apply for “pupillage,” a one-year apprenticeship; before finally 
attempting to get tenancy in a Chambers, without which it can be financially 
difficult to practice (Harris, 2002). To illustrate the degree of competition, in 
2011 there were 3017 applicants for the practitioner training course, but only 
197 people achieved a place in Chambers, a proportion of 0.07% (BPTC (Bar 
Professional Training Council), 2012). Pupillage, leading up to an application for 
tenancy in Chambers, is therefore a time of low status and uncertainty, and is 
characterised by feelings of anxiety, shame, and distress; with the start of 
tenancy also experienced as frightening (Rogers, 2014). Having completed 
pupillage and gained tenancy, barristers will begin their career with the lower-
status cases of the MC; only later progressing to bigger cases at the Crown 
Court (Morison & Leith, 1992). 
Whilst Australian and U.S. lawyers have been a focus of psychological 
research, little exists on UK barristers4. However, the Bar’s esoteric practices 
have been of some interest to sociology, and the discipline’s research in this 
area offers a helpful perspective on the contextual influences on barristers. 
“Professional socialisation” refers to a developmental process; whereby 
individuals acquire the knowledge, skills, and sense of occupational identity 
characteristic of a profession; and internalise the values and norms of that 
group (Howkins & Ewens, 1999). It involves learning the unwritten rules and 
professional expectations (Harris, 2002). For barristers, this is a protracted 
process that spans several years, and is intensified by the hermetic nature of 
                                            
4 One hesitates to be conclusive, but after extensive searching, I have found precisely 
zero psychological research involving UK barristers  
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the discipline. To illustrate, a minimum number of meals must have been eaten 
at one of the four Inns of Court for a barrister to be “called to the Bar,” and the 
process itself involves a formal and arcane ceremony (Harris, 2002).  Collective 
norms are expressed overtly (e.g. interactions within the community) and 
symbolically (e.g. wearing the wig and gown; Whelan, 2001). 
By virtue of the complexity of the work, professional codes cannot provide 
barristers with definitive answers; instead, instinctive and intuitive judgement is 
valued. Professionalism is therefore seen as a means of holding collective 
responsibility for these decisions, ostensibly to empower barristers (Whelan, 
2001). However, one definition suggests socialisation is complete when other 
members of the group, observing the newcomer, would deem them competent 
(Howkins & Ewens, 1999). This is particularly pertinent to the insular world of 
the Bar, where progression is dependent upon the approval of peers (Whelan, 
2001); and thus, observably conforming is necessary for occupational success. 
Arguably, professional socialisation therefore represents a (successful) attempt 
by the gatekeepers of the profession to retain power and influence, and 
operates as a means of exerting control over the future behaviour of its 
members (Harris, 2002). 
 EMOTIONAL LABOUR 
One consequence of professional socialisation that is relevant for this thesis, is 
that of emotional labour. Originally described in research with waitressing staff, 
it refers to the management of emotional displays that are necessary to perform 
a work role (Paules, 1991). These form part of the professional expectations, 
and are incorporated into the occupational socialisation and acculturation; which 
as described above, significantly influence barristers’ behaviour. Whilst feigning 
emotions in court is sometimes necessary, the primary burden on barristers is 
the need to suppress genuine emotions (Harris, 2002), such as distress or 
sadness; with admitting stress not the “done thing” at the bar (Harris 2002, pp 
573). There is pressure to suppress emotions not only in front of clients and the 
court, but also pertinently, in front of peers. This pressure can be understood in 
relation to professional views on emotion: that detachment from emotional 
states is equated to rationality, and that furthermore, suppressing emotion is an 
inherent aspect of professionalism (Harris, 2002).  
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Barristers may also feel pressured to suppress unconfident or hesitant feelings.  
This is of particular relevance to the junior barristers interviewed for this thesis, 
who necessarily lack experience when they begin working at the MC. Whilst 
professionally, barristers are obligated not to take on any work that “he [sic] 
knows or ought to know he is no competent to handle,” (Bar Standards Board, 
2013, pp 27), the professional context of fierce competition and constant 
assessment does not encourage such admittances of incompetence. Instead, 
barristers completing pupillage found that: 
““Self confidence out of proportion to your role” was expected.” 
  (Rogers 2014, pp 41) 
  
Indeed, in order to refuse a client, one must admit to being “professionally 
embarrassed”: 
“A barrister must not accept any instructions if to do so would cause him 
to be professionally embarrassed and for this purpose a barrister will be 
professionally embarrassed:  
if he lacks sufficient experience or competence to handle the matter.” 
(Bar Standards Board, 2013a, pp 27)  
In summary, it is therefore argued that there is a powerful professional context 
influencing barristers’ working lives, which leads to the suppression of the 
display of negative, or unconfident, emotions. The psychological implications of 
this are threefold. First, suppression has direct effects on health, with for 
example thought suppression being shown to have acute effects on the immune 
system (Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998). Secondly, suppression is linked to 
emotional exhaustion (Harris, 2002). Thirdly, it prevents barristers from 
accessing social support within their community. Both of these latter points are 
associated with burnout, a state of psychological stress. Before describing 
burnout, two other risk factors will be discussed: role overload and role conflict. 
 ROLE OVERLOAD  
Barristers are likely to experience role overload, where the demands of an 
occupational role exceed the employee’s perceived ability to meet it (Gomme & 
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Hall, 1995). Criminal barristers report an average of 55 working hours a week, 
which is likely to underestimate the workload of junior barristers in the MC, who 
will typically have many more cases than those in the Crown Court; they also 
take the least holiday of any other faction of the legal profession (Bar Standards 
Board, 2013b). These long working hours are independently associated with 
burnout in lawyers (Bergin & Jimmieson, 2013).  
Whilst already working long hours, barristers then have to find a way to work 
with the considerable proportion of defendants who have mental health 
difficulties. As discussed above, the expectation of learning on the job, and 
appearing confident, leaves barristers with little choice but to accept these 
clients. Yet it is entirely possible they feel poorly resourced for this work, as 
mental health training for barristers is currently neither required nor provided 
(Bar Standards Board, 2013a). Neither are professional guidelines offered on 
how best to defend these clients. This is despite the fact that, worryingly, they 
are often the first professional within the justice system to identify a mental 
health concern (Magill & Rivers, 2010). Insufficient training was raised as a 
concern by barristers in a piece of qualitative research on fitness to plead (a 
specific legal procedure related to mental health); they suggested that in order 
to properly advise and represent their clients, improved mental health 
awareness was needed (Rogers, Blackwood, Farnham, Pickup, & Watts, 2009).  
Whilst training has been recommended by the Advocacy Training Council 
(2011, pp 48), the Fair Access to Justice Report (Talbot, 2012), and an 
independent review of criminal advocacy (Jeffrey, 2014); political and 
professional will to implement these recommendations remains unclear. The 
Bar Council has neither introduced a regulatory requirement, nor co-ordinated 
training (Cooper, 2011); and a review of the Bradley Report does not mention 
defence counsel at all, less still make any recommendations for their training or 
practice (Durkan, Saunders, & Hazard, 2014).  
As discussed, vulnerable defendants do not have the same legal recourse to 
special measures as vulnerable witnesses, and may therefore struggle to fully 
participate in their trial. Research suggests that barristers feel a strong sense of 
responsibility to help their clients understand proceedings, and consider this 
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part of their role (Barry, 2010); yet without training, and within the incredibly time 
pressured environment of the MC, they may struggle to meet these needs. 
Finally, due to insufficient training and social support, barristers may lack the 
emotional resources to meet the needs of distressed clients. Whilst the 
courtroom process is stressful for most participants, it may be particularly 
aversive for those who already struggle to manage their emotions, such as 
those with mental health difficulties (Durkan, 2009). Furthermore, barristers may 
need to discuss traumatic events (e.g. domestic violence), or review disturbing 
evidence, as part of their role in presenting the defence. Considerable research 
suggests this places lawyers at risk of secondary trauma, and some may go on 
to develop experiences such sleeplessness, anxiety, or detachment (Fischman, 
2008, Levin & Greisberg, 2003, Levin et al., 2012), although thus far this has 
primarily been researched in Australia and America. 
A further aspect of role overload for barristers, then, is attempting to meet the 
particular needs of their clients with mental difficulties, despite lacking the 
resources to do so.  Role overload, particularly where the demands are 
emotional, is predictive of burnout; a second risk factor, role conflict, is 
described below. 
 ROLE CONFLICT 
Barristers are confronted with a number of impossible dilemmas: responsible for 
helping their clients to understand their trial, yet ill resourced to do so; aware of 
recourse to specific mental health defence strategies, but also aware of their 
limitations and risk of harm. They have: 
“an overriding duty to the Court to act with independence in the interests 
of justice: he must assist the Court in the administration of justice and must not 
deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the Court.” 
  (Bar Standards Board, 2013b (302))  
Yet must, 
“…promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful means the 
lay client’s best interests and do so without regard to his own interests or to any 
consequences to himself or to any other person.” 
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  (Bar Standards Board, 2013b (303)) 
They thus have two irreconcilable duties: to the court, but also to the best 
interests of their client. Things appear little progressed from the 1970s: 
“In a case where the accused is or may be suffering from mental illness, 
however, a new range of ethical dilemmas arises – problems for which there 
may be no solutions, problems involving such unacceptable alternatives that it 
is inappropriate and unfair to force the defence attorney to choose among 
them.” 
 (Chernoff & Schaffer, 1971 pp 505)  
Burnout is associated with such conflicts in values, where workers are 
compelled to work in a way that feels unethical (Maslach, 2003).There is little 
research on how barristers manage these dilemma. One Canadian qualitative 
study found a typology of lawyers’ defence strategies, leading to the 
maximisation of one component of their work, to the neglect of the others. For 
example, aiming to process clients as quickly as possible through the courts, 
but to the detriment of their defence (Laberge & Morin, 2001); the emotional 
repercussions of these choices were not explored.  Where unaddressed, role 
overload and conflict can lead to role strain, discussed below. 
 CHRONIC OVER DEMAND AND ROLE STRAIN 
An occupational model of stress, the job demands and resources model, 
proposes that when job demands are chronically high, and resources are low, 
the result is role strain (Bergin & Jimmieson, 2013). Role strain leads to 
exhaustion, which in its turn, leads to burnout. Barristers are already at risk of 
burnout (e.g. Bergin & Jimmieson, 2013) but it is suggested here that working 
with clients with mental health needs, without training or support, puts them at 
increased risk. Burnout, and its potential consequences for both barristers and 
their clients, will now be described. 
 BURNOUT 
Burnout is a form of psychological stress. It has been conceptualised as 
emotional exhaustion, a sense of inner emptiness or depersonalisation, and a 
lowering of personal accountability and motivation (Maslach, 2003). It can lead 
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to a number of unpleasant experiences, such as fatigue, hopelessness, anxiety, 
and aggression (Farber & Heifetz, 1982). Barristers appear to directly map of 
onto all the risk factors for burnout. As discussed above, these include: high 
workload, role conflict or a conflict in values; and a lack of social support or a 
loss of community (Maslach, 2003). The remaining risk factors for burnout are 
insufficient control over resources, arguably the case for untrained barristers in 
the pressured MC; and feeling overwhelmed by responsibility, potentially likely 
for barristers who are working with vulnerable clients (Maslach, 2003). The 
combination of risk factors and mechanisms described above is presented 
schematically in Figure 1, on the next page. 
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Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Proposed Risk Factors for Burnout in Barristers 
28 
 
Neither burnout nor the associated risk factors have been studied in UK 
barristers, and the above is conjecture at this stage. However, equivalent 
research in Australia and America indicates a concerning level of psychological 
distress. Lawyers working with domestic violence and incest cases have been 
found to experience demoralisation, anxiety, and hopelessness, which was 
linked to high caseloads and long hours (Gomme & Hall, 1995). Defence 
lawyers working with clients involved with trauma were found to be at a high risk 
of secondary trauma, burnout, depression, and functional impairment (Levin et 
al., 2011). Lawyers experience higher levels of secondary trauma and burnout 
than healthcare workers (Levin & Greisberg, 2003). Whilst UK barristers may 
have a different experience, it has been suggested here that the particular 
professional context of the Bar, if anything, puts them at increased risk of 
psychological harm5.  
It has been argued that barristers’ emotional health is significantly risked by 
their professional context, particularly when working with clients with mental 
health needs. Such psychological stress is inherently damaging and often lead 
professionals to leave quit their jobs (Maslach, 2003). There may also be 
implications for the clients they represent, discussed below. 
1.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENDANTS WITH MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS 
If barristers do not feel resourced to manage clients with mental health 
difficulties, what are the implications for their clients throughout the courtroom 
process? If barristers are indeed suffering from burnout, considerable research 
suggests that this will reduce their ability to perform their job well; for example, 
leading to impaired decision making (Maslach et al., 2001). Even if they are 
emotionally well, however, their poor training and resources may have 
significant implications for their clients. These will be discussed in terms of 
difficulties identifying mental health, and barristers’ chosen defence strategy; 
and related to barristers’ social status as highly powerful individuals. 
  
                                            
5 N.B. The Bar (and professional context outlined earlier) is UK specific.  
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 POWER AND JOINT DECISION-MAKING 
Barristers consult with their clients about how to plead and the evidence the 
client wishes to present, negotiating a shared plan for the defence presented in 
court. This can be conceptualised as a process of joint decision making. Models 
of joint decision-making suggest that the partner with the most power will be the 
most influential in the decisional outcome (Simpson, Griskevicius, & Rothman, 
2012). It is therefore of interest to consider the power dynamics within the 
barrister-client relationship.  
Barristers form an elite group, holding one of the most powerful positions in 
society (Rogers, 2014), regarded as the most and fourth most prestigious 
career for men and women respectively (Bottero, 2005). Defendants in the CJS, 
however, are likely to have a history of social exclusion, with offending 
behaviour linked to factors including poor education, unemployment, and 
compromised family networks (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002); and as discussed 
throughout, high levels of mental health needs. In addition to the likelihood of 
holding the most social and material power in their advisory relationship with 
their client, barristers are also conferred expert power (French & Raven, 1960) 
by virtue of their professional training in law. Barristers are therefore likely to 
hold the power in this relationship, supported by evidence that that clients 
typically assume a trusting and passive role in relation to a barrister, accepting 
advice without question (Rosenthal, 1974). 
 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF MENTAL HEALTH 
Barristers’ power thereby grants them the authority to define the parameters of 
the client interview, including whether mental health needs are discussed. This 
is pertinent as mental health disclosures are context dependent, and if 
barristers do not explicitly invite such disclosures, mental health needs might 
not otherwise be identified. Yet their lack of training may compromise this, with 
failings by defence counsel linked to: a lack of understanding and training in 
how to identify a mental health difficulty, not utilising relevant experts (e.g. 
psychologists), and not raising the issue of mental health in the first place 
(Covarrubias, 2008). The Bradley Report (Department of Health, 2009) 
interviewed service users about solicitors, who occupy a similar role in court to 
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barristers in this context; and found their lack of training potentially resulted in 
missed opportunities for diversion from the CJS. In a small qualitative study, this 
concern was echoed by barristers themselves, who wondered if they missed 
clients’ needs due to poor mental health training and awareness (Rogers et al., 
2009). 
The sole piece of quantitative research found in this literature search lends 
tentative support to this idea: mental health difficulties were found to be under-
identified in American defendants, relative to both the general population, and 
estimates of the criminal population; and that those with disclosed mental health 
difficulties had poorer outcomes than those without; concluding that mentally ill 
[sic] defendants were harmed by the defence attorneys’ lack of training and 
skills (Gormley, 2013). 
There are significant limitations with this piece of research, as it is somewhat 
tenuous to suggest that responsibility for these poorer outcomes lie solely with 
the defence attorneys when no other factors were controlled for. However, 
research with UK police broadly supports the idea that poor training in mental 
health may lead to under identification of mental health (Adebowale, 2013). 
Their similarly inadequate training and professional guidance on mental health 
is associated with a lack of confidence in their own judgements, resulting in 
potentially poorer decision-making (Adebowale, 2013). Paradoxically, whilst 
barristers hold a powerful position in relation to their client, a lack of training and 
guidance may lead them to feel disempowered to discuss mental health. 
Why is this important? Mental health needs can only be considered if they are 
known. Yet, they are not routinely assessed in court (Khanom et al., 2009) and 
are often missed (Magill & Rivers, 2010). Therefore, barristers’ willingness and 
ability to discuss mental health needs with their clients may have a direct impact 
upon their defence strategy, and the potential outcome for their clients6.  
 PATERNALISM 
                                            
6 The reader is referred to pg. 12 and Appendix A to understand how mental health can 
be used as a defence 
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It is also troubling to consider that the imbalance of power described above may 
threaten the client’s autonomy. Legal paternalism, whereby the client’s wishes 
are superseded by the barristers wish to prevent harm, is well documented7; 
and may be particularly prevalent for those with mental health needs, due to the 
implications of medicalising distress discussed earlier (Luban, 2005)8.  Whilst 
running contrary to their responsibility to act on instructions, barristers may feel 
a greater responsibility for their client’s safety, and privilege this accordingly. 
Research lends some support to this idea, with one UK study finding that some 
barristers adopt an uncompromisingly persuasive approach to their advice, 
attempting to align the client’s plea with the barrister’s conceptualisation of their 
best interests (Barry, 2010). The author notes that this:  
“may undermine an essential tenant of common law jurisdictions: that the 
plea entered by a defendant… is informed and voluntary.” 
 (Barry, 2010, pp 120, emphasis added)  
Furthermore, one study of Canadian attorneys’ experiences of working with 
clients with mental health difficulties, suggested that some used the trial 
process as a proxy for community care, acting as a social worker with the 
primary aim of obtaining treatment for their clients (Laberge & Morin, 2001). A 
majority of participants said that they would not defend these clients as 
aggressively as they would another client. Whilst attempting to act on best 
interests, this paternalism threatened their clients’ autonomy to make decisions 
(Luban, 2005). Moreover, it potentially exposed them to restrictive treatment 
that they had not requested. Barristers may thereby inadvertently compromise 
their clients’ human rights.  
Finally, in the study mentioned above, lawyers perceived clients with mental 
health difficulties to be more difficult and unreliable, with some suggesting they 
were responsible for both their mental health issues and their associated crimes 
(Laberge & Morin, 1998). Their formulation of distress and notions of 
blameworthiness thereby had a direct influence on their defence strategy, 
                                            
7 For a striking example, see the story of the Unabomber, whose lawyers attempted to 
run a mental health defence without his consent (Associated Press, 1999) 
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leading to the next item of interest for this research: barristers’ constructions of 
distress.  
 CONSTRUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DISTRESS AND DEVIANCY 
As outlined above, poorer outcomes for clients with mental health needs may 
be mediated by barristers’ constructions of mental health; therefore this 
research will therefore attempt to explore how barristers construct and explain 
distress in the context of offending behaviour (described here as “deviancy”).  
Barristers are exposed to competing narratives. As they lack professional 
guidance and training, it may be that barristers draw their ideas about distress 
from the context of the courtroom. Historically, psychiatry has been significantly 
more involved in the courts than psychology (Leslie, Young, Valentine, & 
Gudjonsson, 2007); both reflecting and reinforcing the dominance of a medical 
model of psychological distress in the legal system (Gerard, 1986). Legal 
guidance on mental health uses the terminology “mental disorder” (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2010). Whilst prosecutors consider clients with a diagnosis 
of post-traumatic stress disorder less criminally culpable and empathise with 
them more (Wilson et al., 2011), there is no research on whether this extends to 
barristers, or other forms of psychological distress.  
Furthermore, the most frequent diagnosis of those in the CJS is personality 
disorder (Fazel & Danesh, 2002). This is arguably less well-recognised by the 
general public as an “illness,” and psychiatry has historically dichotomised such 
individuals as “bad” rather than “mad” (Hall et al., 2011). Empirical research is 
lacking in this area; one study suggested legal professionals may view a 
personality disorder diagnosis as not meeting a mental health treatment 
threshold, but this was not explored in depth (Khanom et al., 2009). Blame and 
culpability has been found to be associated with type of diagnosis in research 
with jurors, with those deemed more responsible for the onset of their “illness” 
viewed more negatively (Fenwick, 2011); it may therefore be that barristers may 
also consider clients with a label of personality disorder are somehow less 
deserving, or more responsible for their actions.  
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Thus, barristers may be influenced by a medical model that considers 
defendants to be “mad,” or potentially, for certain clients, they may consider 
them fully culpable and consider them to be merely be “bad” (a criminalising 
narrative). Considering their role is to defend their client, adopting this latter 
conceptualisation would seem somewhat surprising. However, as described 
earlier, some Canadian lawyers’ discourse did appear to reflect a criminal 
justice ideology, feeling that their clients were responsible, and needing to be 
punished and taught the consequences for their actions (Laberge & Morin, 
1998).  
Finally, an alternative model of deviancy might be provided by a psychological 
or social model, which relates offending behaviour to environmental causes. 
Whilst one study suggested lawyers preferred psychiatrists to psychologists, 
finding psychological formulation considerably more complex, jargon-filled, and 
less useful than psychiatric diagnoses (Leslie et al., 2007); this was in the 
context of gaining reports for use in the courtroom. It may therefore reflect their 
views on the utility of such reports as evidence, rather than their personal views. 
There is no research on this to date, and as lay people tend to prefer 
psychosocial explanations of distress over medical diagnoses (Jorm, 2000), it is 
fair to consider that this may also be a narrative reflected by the barristers. 
 STIGMA 
Finally, some thoughts on stigma. One legal paper suggested that peoples lived 
experience of stigma would induce them to “mask” their mental health 
difficulties, thereby reducing the barrister’s chance of identifying these 
(Covarrubias, 2008). Barristers may therefore need to work hard to quickly form 
a trusting relationship with a client, and explicitly welcome disclosure of mental 
health difficulties, or they may not be expressed. It is has been suggested that 
barristers own stigmatised attitudes may impede this conversation  
(Covarrubias, 2008). This is a reasonable assumption, given the prevalence of 
stigma (Hinshaw, 2007); there is no reason to think that barristers should be 
immune from these wider societal influences. Indeed, research within the CJS 
with police officers has found poor training in mental health is associated with 
fear, stigma, and discriminatory practices; this may extrapolate to barristers 
(Adebowale, 2013). The potential for stigmatised attitudes will therefore be 
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considered from a position of curiosity, aiming to neutrally explore these if 
identified. 
1.7 SUMMARY  
A significant proportion of defendants in the MC will have some degree of 
mental health difficulty. Historically, however, the CJS has neglected their 
needs, resulting in systematic disadvantage to these clients, perhaps even 
compromising their human rights. Whilst the government has acknowledged 
these failures and proposes a radical overhaul, at present there is little change 
on the ground, and a parallel process of cost-cutting that threatens to 
undermine any positive changes. Defendants therefore enter into an immensely 
pressured system. 
These systemic pressures have to be negotiated by the defendant’s legal 
representative: their barrister. Barristers play a crucial role in the courtroom 
process, constructing and negotiating a defence for their clients. They are 
hugely powerful agents, particularly as part of a dyad with a likely materially and 
socially disadvantaged client. Lacking training or professional guidance; and 
exposed to competing narratives of both the criminalising legal context, and the 
medicalised discourse of mental health; it is unclear how their constructions of 
distress might influence their identification and defence of mental health. Whilst 
mental health difficulties rarely constitute a defence in its own right, a diagnosis 
can otherwise be used tactically (e.g. fighting for the prosecution to drop the 
case). It has been suggested that there is a risk of legal paternalism, where 
barristers act on presumed best interests rather than collaboratively; equally, if 
they do not feel confident to discuss mental health, their client may be deprived 
of defence options.  
Having reviewed the limited available literature on barristers, it seems that as a 
group they are at risk of burnout, a state of psychological stress; but that 
moreover, they may be particularly taxed emotionally when working with clients 
with mental health difficulties. Barristers may end up fulfilling roles outside of 
their ostensible job description, as their clients’ needs will not otherwise be met 
by the CJS. Yet, they are ill resourced to do so, by an exceptionally high 
workload and pressured working environment, conflicts in role with no 
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acceptable resolution, a professional context that promotes emotional 
suppression rather than support-seeking, and a total dearth of training in mental 
health. Barristers’ emotional health may thereby be damaged, as might their 
ability to defend their clients. 
1.8 QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE LITERATURE SEARCH 
Since there is a poverty of research that explicitly addresses barristers and 
mental health, a number of questions relevant to clinical psychology are 
apparent from the literature search. Barristers face pressure from a likely very 
stressful working environment, and are not trained in mental health. They 
perhaps may not feel resourced to meet their clients’ mental health needs, so 
what is it like for them to work with these clients? Without training and exposed 
to competing narratives of distress, how do they construct mental health? Does 
the way they construct mental health have an influence on the identification of 
mental health needs, or the way that they defend their clients in court, and what 
implications might this have for their clients’ outcomes such as sentencing, or 
referrals to liaison and diversion schemes? How do they feel about these 
outcomes? There is currently no research that considers these issues. 
The huge numbers of defendants within the CJS who are experiencing mental 
health difficulties all are undoubtedly of interest to psychology. These 
individuals may well be better served within the mental health services, rather 
than the CJS. However, it is acknowledged that if the alternative route is 
medicalisation, this merely presents a different set of problems. Therefore, the 
links between these two systems will be explored, but without an agenda of 
increasing referrals between them.   
The literature on burnout has been presented here for readability, however, it 
was in fact only consulted and written after the analysis stage. Whilst posing 
many questions for clinical psychology (for example, how do barristers manage 
such a high workload?), this literature did not inform the research question 
below. 
The research question is framed around the courtroom process, i.e. that of pre-
trial, during the trial, and post-trial outcomes. The questions therefore address 
these sequentially: what knowledge and experience barristers bring pre-trial 
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including how they construct mental health; how they work with clients during 
the trial, including specific legal actions taken but also how distress is managed; 
and how trial outcomes could be influenced by mental health difficulties. Due to 
a lack of substantial research in this area, this study will take an exploratory 
approach. 
1.9 RESEARCH QUESTION 
How do barristers work with psychological distress throughout the Magistrates’ 
Court process?  
1. How do barristers construct mental health, and what experience do they 
have of working with clients who they perceive to have a mental health 
difficulty? 
2. How do barristers defend clients who they perceive to have a mental 
health difficulty, and how do they work with their clients’ associated 
distress?  
3. How might a mental health difficulty influence the outcome of the court 
case, from the perspective of the defence barrister? 
37 
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter details the methodology employed within the study, and offers 
justification for these methods. Further comment and possible alternatives are 
discussed reflexively in the final chapter. 
2.1 DESIGN 
A qualitative methodology is useful when little is known about the topic at hand, 
and is suitable for broad research questions (Willig, 2013). This research aimed 
to gain a greater understanding of how barristers work with their clients’ 
psychological distress throughout the courtroom process, an area that has been 
little researched, and the research questions were broad and exploratory. A 
qualitative methodology was therefore employed as a means of generating 
detailed descriptions and gaining a greater understanding of a relatively 
unknown topic.  
Data was collected via individual semi-structured interviews, employing both 
scripted and ad hoc follow-up questions. This is a useful means of gaining data 
where the research aim is exploratory, as participants can influence what is 
discussed, and unexpected items of interest can arise in discussion (Willig, 
2013). The flexibility to ask follow up questions also allows the interviewer to 
probe responses, garnering detailed understandings of the topic.  
2.2 EPISTEMOLOGY  
Bateson & Bateson (1987) state that those who claim to have no epistemology 
have a particularly bad one; this is perhaps particularly true of researchers. 
Arguably, all those involved in producing knowledge should state their 
epistemological position, for reasons of transparency. In practice, this tradition 
is more established in the world of qualitative research, where it is more 
accepted that analysis is an inherently interpretive act; accordingly, a statement 
of epistemological position allows the reader to understand how this has 
influenced the research outcomes (Harper, 2011). Position, design, and 
analysis should all be epistemologically aligned. 
This research has been undertaken from a position of critical realism. It offers 
an alternative to naive realism: that our senses and knowledge can directly 
represent the world exactly as it is; but also challenges the post-modern idea 
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that knowledge can be reduced to the means by which we produce it (Pocock, 
2014). It is suitable for the purposes of this research as it allows for the 
examination of how mental health is constructed, acknowledging that “mental 
health problems” are in fact a socially constructed phenomena, which do not 
literally exist and evolve within a particular time, place and culture (Ussher, 
2010). One can legitimately examine the phenomena of mental health from a 
social constructionist perspective, considering how language shapes and limits 
our experience. Yet, the barristers in this study do exist in the real world, in the 
real system of the CJS. Their actions have real implications for defendants, 
including their participation in the trial, and their eventual acquittal or 
sentencing. Whilst the assumptions underlying the CJS is in and of itself socially 
constructed, this research nonetheless takes the position that there is a real 
world out there, existing outside of perceptions, constructions and theories, and 
therefore takes a realist ontological position (Maxwell, 2012). Critical realism is 
therefore a suitable epistemological position, as it allows both the examination 
of the constructs held by barristers in relation to mental health, and the linking of 
this to the external reality of the courtroom, and speculation on the potential 
implications for defendants. 
2.3 ANALYSIS 
Thematic analysis is flexible enough to allow a “contextualist” perspective, 
between constructionism and essentialism, allowing an examination of the 
meanings made of experiences within their social context, but with attention 
also paid to the material reality of those claims, and was chosen for this study 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Other more discursive approaches such as discourse 
analysis can be very helpful for understanding how experiences are 
constructed, but do not allow for exploration of systems within the real world. 
This is because epistemologically, reality is considered to be socially 
constructed and does not exist outside of discourse (Pocock, 2013). As outlined 
above, this research takes a critical realist position and therefore social 
constructionist approaches such as discourse analysis were ruled out. 
Other qualitative methods are suitable for a critical realist epistemological 
position, and qualitative methodology. For example, grounded theory can be 
undertaken from this position, and aims to be inductive. However, it also 
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requires a high degree of expertise, which as a novice researcher I did not 
possess, and aims to generate theories, whereas this research aimed more 
broadly to increase understanding (Willig, 2013). Interpretative 
phenomenological analysis would also fit with a critical realist position, but 
would similarly change the focus, in this case to that of understanding the 
participants’ personal feelings and experiences, rather than attempting to 
describe how they understood their clients’ experiences (Willig, 2013). Thematic 
analysis was therefore considered the most suitable for the research question, 
epistemological position, and methods; and chosen as the means of analysis. 
2.4 SAMPLING 
Given the practical impossibility of studying all instances of a phenomena, 
qualitative research instead necessitates sampling the population in question. A 
sample can only be considered adequate if errors are small enough to not 
nullify the conclusions of the research; yet this must be weighed against the 
pragmatics of analysing the large datasets produced by transcribed interviews. 
One approach is to aim for theoretical saturation, concluding collection at the 
point at which no new insights are being generated by additional data (Oppong, 
2013). Given the limited timescale for this piece of research, an attempt was 
made to predict the point of theoretical saturation in advance, and sample 
accordingly. Saturation is generally reached between six and 12 participants 
(Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006), and given the length of the interviews (60 
minutes), the lower end of this range was considered sufficient. Therefore, eight 
participants were recruited. Again, for practicality, convenience sampling was 
used, and participants were found via my contacts in the legal profession, and 
word-of-mouth. With the exception of the pilot interview (discussed below), no 
participant was known personally to me.  
2.5 SCOPE  
As discussed in the introduction, certain exclusions were made in order to focus 
the work exclusively on the experience of those with mental health difficulties. 
All participants worked in courts in London, UK. The MC was chosen, as has 
been discussed in the introduction, and the Crown Court was therefore 
excluded.   
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2.6 PARTICIPANTS  
In total eight criminal defence barristers took part (Table 1). Five were male and 
three were female. The length of time that participants had been working as a 
barrister ranged from 10 months to six years, and their rough estimates of the 
number of clients they had seen ranged from 100 to 1000. Their relative 
inexperience reflects the career structure outlined in the introduction, whereby 
those practising in the MC tend to be the most junior barristers. Participants 
were not specifically recruited based on gender, race or age.  However, the 
percentage of males in this sample (62.5%) is very close to the national 
average of 64.2% male barristers (The General Council of the Bar of England 
and Wales, 2014).  
Table 1: Participant Demographics 
Participant 
Number 
Name Gender Years Practicing as a 
Barrister 
Estimated Number of 
Clients Seen 
1 Joe Male 3 years About 1000 
2 Matt Male 5.5 years About 500 
3 Jess Female 10 months About 100 
4 Jen Female 2 years About 200 
5 Tina Female 5 years About 1000 
6 Lee Male 6 years 400 to 500 
7 Ben Male 2 years 250 to 300 
8 Max Male 2.5 years 500 to 600 
 
The discrepancy between the number of years practising as a barrister, and 
estimated number of clients seen, reflects various things. Some participants, 
e.g. Max, included clients they had seen when working as a paralegal (prior to 
becoming qualified as a barrister), inflating their total; whereas others may have 
had repeat clients, or lengthy cases, lowering their total.   
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Three participants came from the same Chambers in London (participants 5-7: 
Tina, Lee and Ben).  Only limited information can be given about this 
Chambers, due to the potential risk of identifying them. However, as a very 
large Chambers, three participants represent less than 5% of their total number 
of employed barristers. Therefore, whilst the potentially biasing effects of 
drawing from one Chambers were held in mind during the analysis, it was 
expected that the large numbers of barristers working there reduced this risk.  
2.7 MATERIALS 
Materials included a Dictaphone, a printed interview schedule, a password 
protected computer, and Nvivo 10 software for data analysis. 
2.8 CONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
On the basis of the limited literature available to me, I constructed a pilot 
interview schedule which was trialled on a friend of mine who worked as a 
barrister. I amended the schedule on the basis of his feedback and data 
gathered. No service user was consulted during this process. The finalised 
interview schedule was then used with all eight participants (Appendix A).  
The schedule was designed to mirror the courtroom process as described in the 
research question, i.e. the constructs and knowledge that was brought to the 
trial, how they defended the case and managed distress during the trial itself, 
and their thoughts on outcomes. Since a working assumption for this thesis was 
that barristers would not be trained in mental health and that this might be 
problematic, this was specifically queried, as well as what kinds of training might 
be useful.  
As exploratory research, with little directly relevant research to guide the 
questions, the schedule was designed as a series of jumping off points for 
discussion. Prompting was given to elaborate and points reflected back or 
queried, as is typical within semi-structured interviews (Willig, 2013). The 
participants were, not unexpectedly, keen orators with much to say. Therefore 
whilst the schedule may perhaps seem to consist of more closed questions than 
is typical in qualitative research, the interviews themselves were open and 
exploratory. An extract is provided in Appendix B for illustrative purposes. For 
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these reasons, the extra prompt question was not used in any case, as the 
participants provided these details in their discussion of the other questions.       
2.9 ETHICS 
Participants were given an information sheet in advance, and encouraged to 
ask questions, before signing the consent sheet (Appendix C, D); a copy of the 
information sheet and consent form was left with them. Participants were 
advised of their right to withdraw, although none did so. All transcripts were 
anonymised (i.e. using pseudonyms and changing identifying references). Data 
was stored on a password protected computer. Audio recordings will be 
destroyed after completion of the viva, and any required amendments are made 
and accepted by the examiners and graduate school. Transcripts will be 
destroyed after three years. Whilst the interview was not expected to be 
upsetting, contact details of a generic support association was offered to all 
participants post-interview (The Samaritans).  
Ethical approval was sought and obtained from the UEL School of Psychology 
Research Ethics Sub-Committee (Appendix E).  
2.10 PROCEDURE 
All interviews took place in a private room at participants’ place of work, with the 
exception of one that was held in an interview room at the University of East 
London. Consent was taken as described above.  
The semi-structured interview was then audio recorded. Interviews were 
intended to take around 50-60 minutes, which was the case for all but one of 
the interviews, which took 1hr 30 minutes (Max). Following the interview, 
participants were offered time to debrief and ask any further questions. The 
audio-recording was then transferred onto a password-protected computer, and 
transcribed.  
2.11 TRANSCRIPTION 
I completed all transcription myself, using an adapted transcription scheme 
(Appendix F). This was relatively simple and did not capture very detailed 
aspects of the verbal data (e.g. intonation), as this was not considered 
necessary or useful to answer the research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
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However, a verbatim, word-for-word account was recorded, and relevant non-
verbal data was also transcribed (e.g. “[laughter]”). Punctuation was used for 
comprehension, whilst aiming to remain true to the intended meaning of the 
original speech. 
2.12 THEMATIC ANALYSIS: SIX STEPS 
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data, following the steps outlined in 
Braun & Clarke (2006) (see Appendix G for this information presented in a 
table). 
 FAMILIARISING WITH THE DATA AND INITIAL CODES 
Familiarisation with the data began by listening to and transcribing all 
interviews. Notes were kept on reflections, questions, and ideas, which were 
kept in mind during coding, and the later construction of themes (Appendix H). 
Transcripts were imported into Nvivo 10, and read through a final time, before 
starting the process of coding. This software supports “automatic coding,” but 
this was not employed and all coding was completed manually.  
As the aim was for the final themes to be “data driven,” rather than “theory 
driven,” the entirety of the features of the dataset were coded, rather than only 
specific content. Whilst all data was attended to, inevitably some codes were 
guided by the research question. For example, I particularly coded for 
constructions of mental health, whilst remaining open about what those might 
be. Line by line coding was used, attempting to capture as much detail as 
possible about the data (Appendix I). Due to using data analysis software, it 
was possible to have large numbers of codes. The final list is presented in 
Appendix J and consists of 511 codes. The process of organising these into 
themes began quite early as the list became longer, and I organised these 
hierarchically for ease of use (Appendix K). 
 SEARCHING FOR THEMES 
Searching for themes involved sketching out a preliminary “map” of the data, 
using pencil and paper, which were initially very rough. I used memos that had 
been made during transcription and coding to guide my thoughts, as well as the 
initial process of categorisation that had taken place during coding. Additionally, 
one feature of Nvivo allows cross-tabulation of codes, which was a useful way 
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to consider relationships. As I sketched, I organised codes into potential themes 
using Nvivo. The thematic “map” was re-sketched on several occasions, as 
themes were revised (Appendix L). Organising the codes whilst still coding is a 
slight divergence from the referenced process. However, thematic analysis is a 
flexible model and allows for such creativity (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Eventually, 
all codes were organised into proposed themes. 
 REVIEWING AND DEFINING THEMES 
Proposed themes were then assessed for internal homogeneity and external 
heterogeneity (Patton, 2002): looking for data within a theme to hang together 
meaningfully, and data between themes to be sufficiently different and distinct. 
Some subthemes were collapsed, as they contained similar content. All themes 
and subthemes contained data from more than one participant. Where apparent 
contradictions emerged in a theme (e.g. one participant had very different 
opinions), these were noted but kept within the theme, and brought into the 
analysis. 
These candidate themes were then reviewed against the coded data extract, to 
see if the content matched the thematic description. This was made simpler by 
Nvivo, as data is collated very easily. Finally themes were reviewed in relation 
to the entire dataset, by re-reading the transcripts. Arguably, this step is 
particularly important when using data analysis software, as the coding can 
become completely decontextualised. The themes identified seemed to tap into 
the meanings present in the dataset as a whole. Finally, themes were defined, 
described, and interpreted; and a final thematic map produced; presented in the 
following chapter. 
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3 ANALYSIS 
Thematic analysis generated two overarching themes for the data, illustrated below in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Thematic Map 
Theme Two: Professional Anxiety 
Responsibility 
Recognition of 
a Flawed 
System 
Illusion of 
Confidence 
Conflicting 
Obligations 
Ill Resourced 
Pressures 
Theme One: Working With Clients’ Mental Health Difficulties 
Construction of 
Mental Health 
Identifying and 
Defending 
Mental Health 
Systemic 
Issues May 
Compromise 
Defence 
Mitigating Harm and 
Managing Distress 
Barristers’ 
Distress 
 
 
 
46 
 
N.B. repetitions, and filler words have been removed (e.g. “mmm”). See Appendix F 
for transcription scheme. 
3.1 THEME ONE: WORKING WITH CLIENTS’ MENTAL HEALTH DIFFICULTIES 
This theme considers how barristers construct and work with mental health 
difficulties. The five subthemes describe how their clients’ mental health is 
constructed, identified and worked with including issues of paternalism and 
autonomy; the systemic issues that may compromise the defence and how the harm 
of this is mitigated, and how barristers manage both their clients’ and their own 
distress.  
 CONSTRUCTION OF MENTAL HEALTH 
Many of the participants remarked on the difficulty in defining mental health and 
paralleled this with the similarly difficult business of diagnosis, feeling it “was to an 
extent impressionistic” (Joe, 672–673), and contrasting this to other types of 
diagnosis, “I guess that’s the nature of mental health, it’s not as easy to diagnose as 
like a physical ailment,” (Tina, 447–449). Participants varied in what they considered 
a mental health difficulty. Most named more obviously unusual experiences such as 
paranoia, or diagnostic labels such as psychosis. Some participants also included 
depression and anxiety, and these participants tended to give higher estimates of the 
proportion of clients they’d seen with mental health difficulties, for example, 
“There’s a really large number who don’t have any obvious diagnosis […] so 
maybe milder forms […] most of the people that I’ve dealt with in the Magistrate’s 
Court have got some sort of mental health issue.” (Tina, 35-40)  
Whereas Jen, Matt and Jess appeared to only be talking about a particular group of 
clients who had more obviously disturbing difficulties, attributing less severe distress 
to the stress of the trial, 
“There are some things which you sort of expect as part and parcel of the 
court process, so you get people who’re exhibiting anxiety, or complaining of 
symptoms which taken together could amount to depression, and that’s 
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understandable […]  and then you get people like Mr X, with his schizophrenia slash 
paranoid delusions slash psychosis.” (Jen, 474-480)  
All participants talked about how mental health might be differently constructed 
within a courtroom setting, and many remarked on the dilemmas posed when 
medical and legal constructs clashed. For example, most with a mental health 
diagnosis would still be considered fit to plead; or conversely, Ben discusses one 
client who was unfit to plead, yet not covered by the mental health act, leaving him in 
a legal limbo: 
“He cannot be tried for criminal defence, because he is what’s considered 
unfit to plead, and essentially nothing can be done with him because he also doesn’t 
fulfil the criteria to be detained under the mental health act, or have a guardianship 
order imposed on him.” (Ben, 66–74) 
Most participants commented that access to support within the court room was 
dependent upon reification of an illness, either in the form of observable behaviours 
in court, or a medical diagnosis. Many participants commented that mild issues were 
unlikely to be taken into account. This resulted in a Catch-22 situation for barristers 
who wished to get an adjournment in order for their client to have a psychiatric 
assessment, as Magistrates were reluctant to grant this without the evidence of a 
diagnosis: 
“When it’s put with somebody who doesn’t have an obvious problem, it’s even 
harder, because you’re saying, okay, take it on faith, that I think there’s a problem 
but I don’t really know what […] and they’re really reluctant to do that […] I think 
there’s definitely a difference when somebody has been diagnosed.” (Tina, 112–123) 
On the whole, participants felt quite unclear about what personality disorder was (“I 
don’t know what it actually means,” Jen, 481–482), a diagnosis that is a fundamental 
to the old psychiatric, “mad or bad” debate.  
Within the accounts given by participants, there appeared to be something of a 
division in the way they understood their clients’ difficulties. Some participants took 
into account contextual factors such as poverty, social difficulties or related problems 
with alcohol or drugs when explaining mental health problems. Other participants 
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seemed to draw more from a medical narrative, using the language of symptoms, 
disorders and illnesses to think about their clients. These were not absolute ways of 
understanding their clients, and most participants occasionally expressed a 
combination of these perspectives. For example, viewing clients as, “sick,” (Tina, 
149), or “pathological,” (Joe, 293), whilst simultaneously holding a contextualised 
perspective on their clients’ experiences: “but to me I think there’s a spectrum,” 
(Tina, 18). However, on the whole the participants tended to discuss difficulties 
framed by one or other of these perspectives. Ben, Lee, Jen, Tina, and Joe took a 
largely contextualised view of their client’s distress; whereas Jess, Matt, and Max, 
expressed more medicalised perspectives.  
A contextualising position seemed to relate to understanding mental health as a 
spectrum of difficulties, rather than the categorical model of diagnoses. Jen framed 
her thinking outside of a medical model, and instead talked about a wider 
conceptualisation of “the vulnerable client” (160) to also refer to difficulties such as 
learning disabilities. All participants speaking from a contextualising position talked 
about psychosocial factors that may have caused their clients’ distress, for example 
Ben: 
“Depression itself is something that is a damaged person essentially.” (Ben, 
360) 
Participants had an awareness of their clients' related social issues, and made 
meaning out of “symptoms,” as illustrated by Lee: 
“I would construe [mental health conditions] quite widely, so I would include 
depression, I would include stress. […] I think I’m justified in construing it […] that 
widely, because I think depression can lead to abuse of drink or drugs, or for 
relationships to fall apart, and I know stress can lead, to take not that an extreme 
example actually, people that have never been in trouble before reacting slightly 
violently to stressful situations.” (Lee, 467–478) 
They also took into account the context of the trial itself. Most participants described 
how the stress of the trial might interact with their client’s prior distress or 
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vulnerability, with some clients’ pre-existing difficulties made much worse, for 
example, 
“[Clients with diagnosis of PTSD may] not [be] able to recount that properly [in 
court] and that leads to a great extent to the re-victimisation of those people.” (Ben, 
434-347) 
Matt, Max, and Jess spoke from more of a medicalised position, using more 
language like “illness” (Max, 140) and “symptoms,” (Matt, 45), and elaborating less 
about related psychosocial issues. They appeared to think more along diagnostic 
and categorical lines than a spectrum of difficulties, for example, 
“Lots of them have addictions but I don’t think that counts, it’s not something 
that I would classify as a mental health problem […] I don’t know whether that falls in 
your categorization.” (Jess, 345-350) 
They used more reifying language, such as, “if the defendant really is suffering from 
a mental disorder,” (Jess, 205) and tended to talk more about deferring to “mental 
health experts,” (Max, 148).  
 IDENTIFYING AND DEFENDING MENTAL HEALTH 
In a later theme, “systemic issues may compromise defence,” participants describe 
that failing to identify or disclose mental health needs could lead to poorer outcomes 
for clients. Despite this, however, most participants were thoughtful about weighing 
this up against the potential costs of identifying mental health needs, using mental 
health as a defence, and the consequences of psychiatric assessment. 
3.1.2.1  DISCLOSING MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS TO THE COURT 
Participants varied in the extent to which they considered the court room staff 
prejudicial towards mental health difficulties, perhaps reflecting their different 
professional experiences of MC work. Matt, Tina and Max felt that if clients had the 
legitimacy of a clinical diagnosis, the courts were “sympathetic” (Max, 341), and 
would strategically seek diagnosis if they felt this would be in their client’s best 
interests. With the exception of Jess, who did not discuss mental health at all, other 
participants tried to keep disclosures of mental health from the court at the defence 
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stage, as they had little faith that disclosing psychological distress, or diagnosis, to 
the court would be helpful to their clients’ outcomes: 
“The really sad cases really, are the ones where for example someone has 
had a really tough personal life, has developed depression or anxiety because of that 
[…] I have heard magistrates say, when you bring up the issue of depression, oh 
well everyone who comes before us has depression, or whatever issue, it’s not 
something that we take into account, they all have it.” (Ben, 703–730) 
3.1.2.2  IDENTIFICATION OF MENTAL HEALTH  
When describing how they might raise mental health with their client, most 
participants demonstrated sophisticated interpersonal skills, employing a range of 
tactics depending on the individual client.  
Tina described attempting to build “some kind of trust, so that you’re not some 
stranger,” (25). Ben expressed sensitivity to the fact that the question was “not the 
context that they expect to find in” (87), and an awareness that, “even people that 
suffer from mental health issues do internalise the stigma,” (77). Some participants 
felt it was best to “ask in a matter-of-fact way, I don’t make a big deal out of it,” (Lee, 
45) so as to not seem judgemental; whilst others felt this could be “dangerous,” (Jen, 
560), and used indirect methods such as attempting to assess their thinking, or use 
of a hypothetical other to introduce the topic:  
“You know you seem to me to […] to be absolutely fine, however, you might 
understand that maybe somebody who looked at this, like the police officers have, 
like so and so has, might be concerned that you’re not well, or weren’t well at that 
time […] I always put it as a kind of exploratory question […] I mean that seems to be 
okay, it didn’t seem to upset anyone.” (Joe, 325–350)  
Joe and Jen mentioned a real risk of violence associated with these conversations: 
“He had a history of being like this and then getting very violent (.) So (1) I 
couldn’t, I couldn’t raise it with him.” (Joe, 345–347) 
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Some participants recognised a risk to their relationship with their client, although 
Lee found that raising mental health could potentially help, “in many respects it’s a 
way where I can gain their trust I think,” (Lee, 52–53). 
3.1.2.3  ADOPTION OF A MEDICALISING OR CONTEXTUALISING POSITION 
As discussed previously, participants tended to be more committed to either a 
medicalised or contextualised understanding of mental health. These understandings 
seemed to position the participants in different ways, potentially constraining their 
possibilities for action, or opening up particular options. Some speculation on how 
barristers’ interactions with clients or the court might flow from these positions is now 
presented.   
Participants speaking from a contextualising position were more likely to report that 
clients wanted to discuss their mental health. They felt that it was quite likely that 
their client’s mental health needs may not have previously been identified. Tina felt 
that as most of her clients were from disadvantaged backgrounds, “they don’t 
necessarily get referred into the health system and that’s why they’ve never been 
diagnosed with anything,” (Tina 63), and Joe explained that therefore, barristers may 
end up having to look out for these needs, and decide whether or not to refer: 
 “[Barristers] are the ones who, except in (.) very, quite unusual 
circumstances, they are the ones upon whom it falls to make the initial decision 
about whether to refer.” (Joe, 114–118) 
Participants who adopted a medicalising position were more likely to name a 
reluctance to discuss, or masking, of mental health difficulties. This may have related 
to the way the question was framed:  
“You’d sort of think well I can just ask you straight up, you’re a schizophrenic 
or, you know, or you’ve got Asperger’s, or bipolar and sometimes when you ask 
them straight up [laughter] they say, “I’m fine, I don’t know what you’re talking about,” 
and then, sort of look you with a [laughter] slightly sort of unpleasant look, as in, how 
dare you.” (Max, 971–981) 
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Jess appeared to adopt a very medical understanding of mental health, and 
therefore felt strongly that it was not a barrister’s role to identify this. She explained 
that: 
 “It would be a rare case that someone came to a barrister first of all, without 
ever having been caught in the system somewhere else […] I certainly haven’t come 
across it.” (Jess, 421–428)  
Jess’ understanding of mental health appeared to position her as feeling it was 
nothing to do with her, as she was not a mental health expert. This appeared to 
constrain her opportunities to discuss mental health, and she described never having 
asked clients about their mental health; neither had they spontaneously disclosed it. 
Similarly, whilst feeling it was a, “horrendous system,” (265), Max appeared to feel 
totally disempowered: 
“You’re not the doctors, you’re not an expert in mental health, and these rules 
have been brought about by judges, by consultation with the medical profession. So I 
think you have to unfortunately, take a step back and say, look well that’s the 
process that’s been designed.” (Max, 255-265) 
3.1.2.4  PATERNALISM VS. AUTONOMY 
Participants adopted different strategies when faced with clients who were 
apparently less able to make rational decisions. Joe felt that for many of his clients, a 
trial was a chance to restore dignity, and that for some clients, the trial process was 
more important than the trial outcome. Joe therefore primarily considered his role to 
be supporting their autonomy:  
“In a way it vindicated that you act on your instructions, regardless, and for 
some people actually, the criminal process is more important than the result and 
people want to have a trial and they want to see that it’s done fairly (.) Sometimes 
that’s undermined by bad prosecution but it can be undermined by bad defence as 
well, people compelling somebody not to have a trial.” (Joe, 265–272) 
Jen felt empowered to fight the system by assuming responsibility for her clients, 
perhaps due to seeking advice from a senior colleague. Whilst many participants 
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described the generic mental health defence9 available in MCs as discriminatory and 
disadvantageous, “it deprives him actually of a whole defence,” (Max, 222), they still 
did not take Jen’s more extreme position of instead running the trial on their behalf. 
She explained that this necessitated a higher burden of proof: “if (the prosecution) 
have to prove intent, then they’ve got to prove state of mind, so if your client gives 
evidence that he’s actually a tomato [then they can’t]” (Jen, 135–137), and thereby 
gave them greater chance of acquittal than using fitness to plead proceedings, which 
she described as, “you’ve basically folded.” (250) 
Tina assumed responsibility for her clients. Arguably, this led to legal paternalism, 
feeling that some clients were not “capable of telling you what is in their best 
interests,” (252–253) and she would therefore attempt to decide these for them, for 
example, persuading clients not to go to trial:  
“But she was adamant she wanted to run this, she wanted to plead not guilty 
and have a trial and I tried to explain to her lots of times, it’s not in her best 
interests.” (Tina, 316–319) 
Unlike most other participants, Tina viewed getting her client into hospital as a 
potentially helpful treatment: 
“I tried to explain to him again and again, you’re not well, but he didn’t want to 
go prison and whatever, so we had to adjourn it quite a few times, just firstly to get 
him into hospital.” (Tina, 379-382) 
All other participants attempted to resist paternalism where possible. Some 
participants considered the impact on engagement when wondering whether to refer 
someone to mental health services: 
“Because you don’t want to just immediately go referring them to some mental 
health services if it’s not of assistance to them or if it’s just going to make them 
                                            
9 
  A trial of the facts, which could potentially lead to a hospital order (see table on page 16 for 
further details of specific legal processes) 
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disengage and it’s going to harm their ability to engage with the criminal justice 
system.” (Ben, 599–603) 
Several other participants weighed seeking diagnosis up against potentially negative 
consequences, considering that mental health services could be restrictive:  
“[Mental health services] don’t always work to your advantage if you’re coming 
at them through criminal justice, because you end up with restrictions in Broadmoor 
and you never get out.” (Joe, 1076–1079) 
Jess’ reluctance to discuss mental health linked to a deep respect for the client’s 
autonomy, for example explaining that requesting a mental health assessment might, 
“put them in a position perhaps where the defendant doesn’t want to be examined 
and doesn’t need to be examined.” (154–155) 
Rather than directly raising mental health with the court, many participants instead 
attempted to get the prosecution to drop the case. This sidesteps the need to either 
medicalise or criminalise; unfortunately as will be discussed, this approach was often 
met with limited success.  
3.1.2.5 THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMY 
Joe, Matt, and Max all also spoke of the social control function of the CJS. Whilst 
their primary duty was to defend their client, they appreciated that autonomy needed 
to be weighed up against a duty to protect the public from harm: 
“You have to bear in mind as well, if someone is dangerous or is doing 
antisocial things, then, you know, that is, there is a social concern there, I fully 
accept that when I defend, that’s fine. So the question is balancing that 
appropriately.” (Matt, 582-586) 
Max regretfully described a case in which he felt the provisions meant to protect 
those with mental health issues had been taken too far, with someone potentially 
guilty of very serious crimes acquitted.  
Jen, Matt, and Joe all spoke of tempering their support for autonomy with an overall 
sense of duty of care: 
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“I mean if you had, if you had a severely unwell client who obviously needed 
to be in hospital that’s one thing.” (Jen, 297–298) 
“I spoke to the guy on the phone, and he said […] somebody raised mental 
health, awful [….] we’re going to plead, you should always go to trial, and I was like, 
what are you talking about? This guy is guilty, [and] he needs to see a doctor before 
he kills himself.” (Joe, 1105–1109) 
These illustrate the barristers’ feelings that in exceptional circumstances, health 
should be privileged over freedom. 
 SYSTEMIC ISSUES MAY COMPROMISE DEFENCE  
Participants talked about a number of systemic issues that might compromise the 
defence of their clients with mental health needs. These included a vulnerability to 
courtroom pressures, the stress and competence of their defence barrister, 
perceived bias towards the prosecution, and courtroom ignorance and 
discrimination. 
3.1.3.1 VULNERABLE TO TIME AND FINANCIAL PRESSURES 
With the exception of Jess, all participants discussed the immense time and target 
pressure in the MC; with many barristers feeling the purpose was to simply process 
cases, rather than deliver justice: 
“There’s a massive drive to process […] we have to make progress, we have 
to keep it going, we have to resolve, when it’s not always the best course.” (Tina, 
57–61) 
Many participants discussed why this was particularly problematic for their clients 
with mental health needs. Several described that taking instructions “is more 
difficult,” (Lee, 105–109) and identified various difficulties in communication, and 
engagement, that meant they required extra time.  
Communication difficulties included: “people either don’t seem to understand or 
they’ll go off on a tangent,” (Tina, 52); and the dangers of acquiescing: “What they do 
is they just agree to everything that you’re saying, when they don’t actually 
understand what you’re saying,” (Matt, 74–75). There were difficulties reported in 
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clients getting to the solicitors appointments prior to the case, or to the court itself: 
“The day of her trial, she refused to leave her house, because she thought her ex-
husband was going to murder her on the way to court,” (Jen, 156–160). The client’s 
distress could lead to difficulties obtaining instructions: “She was so upset, she 
couldn’t engage, and it took about half the day to be able to get yes or no answers to 
really straightforward questions (Jen, 161-163). Similarly, bizarre or apparently 
illogical requests from the client could conflict with the barrister’s responsibilities to 
the court leading to impasses. For some clients, processing large amounts of 
information could prove problematic: “If you’ve been given a ton of material, 
expecting someone who can’t focus to go through an inch and a half’s worth of paper 
is just not fair, and it skews the whole process” (Jen, 437 – 440). Courts were also 
described as unwilling to give time to request an adjournment for assessment of 
mental health needs. 
Several participants described that effectively defending clients with mental health 
needs took a huge amount of work, which due to recent cuts in legal aid, they would 
not be paid for: 
“I did eleven appearances for the princely sum of £80 […] I think I worked it 
out at about 40 hours of work.” (Jen, 699–703) 
“You know, some days you can earn less than what someone working on 9-
to-5 shift at McDonald’s minimum wage might earn." (Max, 1368–1371) 
Whilst Jen felt that barristers would be unlikely to see this as a disincentive to 
adjourn, Matt was concerned that: 
“The vast majority of the time, frankly, I, you know, I don’t know how prepared 
people will be to devote that kind of time to a very sort of work-intensive but low 
paying case,” (Matt, 319-323), 
with Max taking this further, and expressing ethical concerns about the impact of 
financial pressures on barristers: 
“[Barristers] are becoming obsessed with getting the money so they are 
making decisions based on financial consequences as opposed to making decisions 
in the best interest of the client. Now of course, if you asked anyone directly, do they 
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do that, they’ll say, no because they’ll be in breach of professional ethics, and it’s a 
disciplinary. But you see it.” (Max, 1397-1401) 
Lee described that the drive to process defendants led to “unfair pressure to plead 
guilty,” (327) as did Tina. She additionally explained that due to cuts in legal aid, 
some clients did not qualify for any representation at all, potentially leading to 
miscarriages of justice. 
Several participants spoke of their concern that the intersection of these time and 
financial pressures, with the multiple disadvantages faced by their clients with mental 
health needs, made miscarriages of justice likely; and that a failure to identify mental 
health could have serious implications for their clients:  
“[It has implications for both their defence and] the way everyone deals with 
them […] on top of which, not just defence, but sentence, sometimes the medical 
situation has far more implications for sentence.” (Max, 1050-1052) 
Max also expressed concerns that financially-driven unethical behaviours by 
barristers could lead to: 
“Miscarriages of justice, leading to the wrong decisions being made, leading 
to people’s best interests not being protected and okay, I think that’s a real concern 
to for the average person and a massive concern for someone that needs care.” 
(Max, 1420–1425) 
3.1.3.2 STRESS AND COMPETENCE  
The incredible stress on junior barristers, and lack of training and support, could 
potentially lead to poorer outcomes for their clients. Matt explained the problem with 
having to learn on the job: 
“Interviewer: So your very first clients, with these difficulties - 
Matt: -they’re like basically a, almost like a test case for you. They don’t know 
that! <no> but that’s what they are.” (Matt, 652-655) 
Max described how stress could lead to:  
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“You’re just going to neglect their needs […] if you’re tired and stressed, and 
already, you know, exhausted mentally from the pressures and stresses and the 
upsetting nature of the job, you’re not going to be able to look after them properly.” 
(Max, 733-744) 
3.1.3.3 BIAS TOWARDS A PROSECUTION 
Many participants perceived that, “there’s a bias towards a prosecution,” (Lee, 48–
49) in the MC. Additionally, whilst vulnerable witnesses are afforded particular 
safeguards in court such as an intermediary, vulnerable defendants are not: 
 “There is a skew in the system which is, you know, he’s the accused, he 
shouldn’t get as much support because he’s probably done something wrong.” (Max, 
314–317) 
3.1.3.4 COURTROOM IGNORANCE AND DISCRIMINATION 
With the exception of Jess, all participants described widespread ignorance and 
discrimination towards mental health in the MC. Many expressed a need for 
comprehensive training for court staff. Several participants described “a culture of 
disbelief,” (Ben, 280). Most participants felt that magistrates were prejudiced against 
those with mental health needs, and therefore describe advising the client not to 
disclose this to the court:  
“I’d love it to be the case that [Magistrates] would look at it sympathetically, 
consider it in the right light  […] I think most people are prejudicial and they say, 
somebody’s been in the street, shouting, swearing at officers. They’ve got a mental 
health condition! There we are! We know what happened. So you don’t mention it.” 
(Joe, 975–985) 
Joe felt uncomfortable that this could potentially perpetuate shame, 
“It’s a shame, because you know (2) in a sense maybe those people then 
think, that shame about mental health conditions is something that’s encouraged in 
the courts, we shouldn’t talk about this, you know, and I feel, I feel very strongly that, 
that’s a bad thing.” (Joe, 98-991) 
Although Max disagreed, and felt:  
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“Once you get into that territory of a serious recognised mental health illness 
(Magistrates) do tend to be a bit more sympathetic.” (Max, 952–954). 
Whilst perhaps reflecting different experiences of different magistrates, this 
difference may be speculatively accounted for by their different constructions of 
distress, as those holding a more contextualised view of their client’s distressed 
seemed more sensitive to courtroom stigma than those holding a more medicalised 
view. 
Many participants described the particular issue in the MC of Magistrates holding 
fused powers, where they are dually responsible for hearing matters related to the 
court process itself, such as requesting extra time, and determining the verdict: 
“[In cases where it’s] very often one person’s word against the other and I 
[need time] to get further instructions from someone who is upset, I don’t want to tell 
the Magistrates it’s because [of their mental health condition] because the main 
witness against them may have exactly the same difficulties [but would not have to 
disclose this to the court].” (Lee, 219-229)  
Barristers did not seem convinced that Magistrates would be able to “put a defendant 
and his previous convictions, or hearsay, out of their minds,” (Lee, 120-122) as: “it 
requires a mental gymnastics sometimes to think, I know that, and I’m not going to 
bear that in mind, eh I just don’t think it can be done.” (Lee, 122–124) 
Whilst a legally valid defence, several participants said that the prosecution were 
extremely reluctant to drop cases on public interest grounds. Ben, who had worked 
in prosecution, felt this connected to other issues of courtroom ignorance and 
discrimination, and suggested that prosecutors  probably lacked training, “I don’t 
know what training CPS prosecutors have, but it’s, I would assume a particular 
problem for them,” and that there was a culture of disbelief in terms of mental health. 
He also felt that, “even if someone was believed [there was] a culture that that it 
didn’t really matter anyway, you just proceed with the prosecution, when someone’s 
done wrong they need to be punished.” (Ben, 281–284) 
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 MITIGATING HARM AND MANAGING DISTRESS  
Lee described that he felt that all barristers were really doing was, “mitigating the 
worst aspects of what can be a very, very unfair system,” (900). Many participants 
talked about the ways that attempted to do this. For example, as an intermediary is 
not available for vulnerable defendants, Jen described working very hard to ensure 
the client understood the process; but Lee explained that this was still not as good as 
an intermediary itself: 
“I can’t, between witnesses I can’t rush back to them to check that they’re 
okay, ask them if they understand something.” (Lee, 197–198) 
Most participants were highly aware of their clients’ multiple social disadvantages, 
and many spoke of the additional strain of assuming the role of a social worker:  
 “You come away feeling like a social worker, as well as being a barrister 
you’re also trying to help somebody who’s frightened, or angry, or very very stressed 
deal with the experience as well as taking their instructions and representing them.” 
(Lee, 71-75) 
Most participants felt their primary task as a barrister was to support their client and 
engage them fully with a stressful process: 
"I might not be the best lawyer […] but I really do try to make the clients feel 
comfortable in a very stressful environment.” (Max, 759–761) 
However, for their clients with mental health needs, this meant dealing with high 
levels of distress: 
“Just the agony, that hatred of the client and the client’s mother towards me, 
because they couldn’t understand why he was being remanded […] Both of them 
became irate, hysterical, the mother had to be taken from the courts because she 
spent every minute that she was there screaming at me.” (Max, 472–482)  
Most participants expressed a wish for training in how to work with and engage these 
clients: 
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“I have had no training whatsoever in how to deal with the fact that he has 
paranoid psychosis. All that I can try and do is […] use the general interpersonal 
skills that I have to try and placate him and calm him down and guide him through 
what is often for him, quite a distressing court process.” (Ben, 72–80)  
Several participants had experienced aggression, and Jess expressed a wish for 
training on managing this. Many participants said that some distress was normal, but 
that very abnormal behaviour was not manageable, and were often feeling very 
unsure about what to do:  
“[Her client said]: ”You’ve got to be able to see this, this is a receipt from an 
erotic website, my husband’s been selling pictures of my daughter,” and you’re 
going, that’s a blank bit of paper, I don’t know what to do, oh [sighs].” (Jen, 152–155)  
Or how to manage this in court, which due to issues raised earlier, were often left to 
barristers to deal with: 
“She would not stop shouting while her husband was giving evidence, and 
there’s absolutely nothing you can do about it and the Magistrates don’t know how to 
deal with her.” (Jen, 145–148) 
Many participants named “suspiciousness” (Jess, 317) as very difficult to work with, 
as it prevented clients from engaging with them; and sometimes led to difficult 
impasses: 
“They keep accusing you of, of not working for them, or working for the court  
and not being independent […] When they doubt that, and continue to doubt it, it’s 
almost nigh on impossible.” (Lee, 490–498)  
Whilst they had received some specific training on risk, it was clear that this did not 
include how to conduct a risk assessment, which is concerning, given the high levels 
of distress that barristers had to deal with: 
“I didn’t know what do with him, because at times he would say things like, 
you know if they keep me in here, I don’t see what the point is of trying to obey the 
rules and trying to do things well, I’m just going to go off the edge, I’m going to do 
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whatever, you know words to that effect. He eventually calmed down so I didn’t do 
anything.” (Jess, 170-176) 
As previously mentioned Jess felt her role did not include discussing mental health 
with her clients, and that looking out for the defendant’s overall welfare would “side-
track” her (112). Given the immense stress and distress expressed by the other 
participants, this seems like an adaptive response to her situation, as she describes 
below: 
“There are so many problems that each one of them has and you initially feel, 
you know, the first couple of clients you get you feel, well you know all these things 
should be able to be sorted out and once you see enough of them you realise that, if 
you, to survive in the job, as a matter of our own mental health I suppose, you have 
to confine yourself to the matters that you can actually deal with.” (Jess, 268-274) 
Lee came to a similar conclusion, feeling incredibly burdened by assuming 
responsibility for his clients’ social issues, and eventually realising: 
“Oh, that’s not actually my role, my role is to simply […] to ask questions and 
give a speech on his behalf it’s not, to try and calm them, take their instructions, help 
them not to panic or freak out in the witness box. I felt there was far too much being 
asked of me.” (Lee, 425-430) 
 BARRISTERS’ DISTRESS  
Given the degree of uncertainty, stress, and emotional intensity associated with the 
work, and barrister’s feelings of personal responsibility and poor access to support, it 
is unsurprising that many of the participants expressed a high level of distress.  
Most participants described the high emotional price of having to work with very 
distressed clients:  
“I spent four days in a, in a trial with somebody who just wept, all day, every 
day and I’ve never seen anything like it, and it was very very distressing for 
everybody.” (Joe, 183-186) 
Some participants described that it was a part of the job that you were meant to get 
used to, but this was difficult: 
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“Part of the job, you’re meant to get used to it like a doctor, who loses a 
patient, but […] it can end up being massively traumatic.” (Max, 468-476) 
“You don’t really forget them, each case is individual and each person is 
individual […] But you have to be able to just drop it from your mind in order to get on 
with the next person the next day.” (Ben, 365–368) 
Ben described the horror, and impact, of reviewing violent evidence: 
“You come to the photos of the crime scene, and someone’s mutilated burnt 
decomposed body, it is, it does have an effect on you  and if you weren’t just dealing 
with looking at the photos of that but maybe watching a video of the murder itself, for 
instance that, that would have a massive effect.” (Ben, 350–356) 
Many participants described feeling helpless, sad, or angry. Feelings of exhaustion 
were common, which made it harder to manage clients with mental health difficulties: 
“I must have done two or three months of a trial every day […] and by the end 
of it, you know I was exhausted, physically and mentally and then on top of that if 
you suddenly have very difficult mental health clients, your capacity to cope is 
seriously weakened.” (Max, 711-717)  
Ben described that without training and resources, “I think inevitably it’s going to lead 
in many cases to, to damage, and that damage may well be that you just stop caring” 
(Ben, 413-415).  
Several participants described as it being “very very distressing,” (Max, 544) when 
their clients were convicted, appreciating their vulnerability within the CJS: 
“They can barely comprehend what’s happening to them […] if you’re 
vulnerable there are people in (prison) who won’t be nice and won’t go, oh don’t 
mess with him, he’s disabled, or he’s got a mental health problem. They’ll take 
advantage of you. “(Max, 549 – 563)  
Distress was most pronounced for the junior barristers, linking to the issues raised in 
the next theme. Lee described feeling preoccupied and “struggling to let things go,” 
(176) in his first couple of years as a barrister, feeling personally responsible and 
completely overwhelmed:  
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“I used to go home thinking that I, I was somehow to blame for my client being 
convicted, despite the fact that the evidence was overwhelming.” (Lee, 208–210) 
 “I think some [barristers] really, not quite crack, but get quite close to that 
times, they feel that cases are upsetting, they feel inadequate, […] It felt sometimes 
like this guy needs, like I can’t cope with everything he needs of me right now.” (136-
141) 
Many participants expressed distress at having to work within a system with which 
they disagreed. Their understanding of this is explored more fully in the next 
subsection, “recognition of a flawed system.” 
3.2 THEME TWO: PROFESSIONAL ANXIETY  
The name of this theme is taken from an extract by Jen, describing the 
overwhelming sense of responsibility she felt for her clients, while simultaneously 
recognising that she may not be capable of meeting their needs. The five sub-
themes consider the barristers’ recognition that they work within a flawed system; the 
specific pressures they face of poor resources, feeling personally responsible, and 
the need to appear confident; and the ethical dilemmas faced when working in such 
a context. 
 RECOGNITION OF A FLAWED SYSTEM  
Several participants felt that the purpose of the CJS was fundamentally at odds with 
their own values, being in favour a system based on rehabilitation, rather than 
punishment:  
“It’s not really designed for a modern understanding of why people commit 
criminal offences, it’s still coming from the angle of people commit offences because 
they are bad people, it’s not aiming to really fix people for the future, so it is 
unreasonably focused on punishment over reform.” (Ben, 317-322) 
Many participants described a wish for the CJS to help people, on either an 
individual or societal level. Dealing with people with mental health problems in the 
CJS was perceived to serve neither purpose: 
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“The CJS […] shouldn’t be about how we get some 50-year-old alcoholic off 
the streets for a few weeks (.) It’s just not designed for that, there are really no social 
benefits that come from putting people like that through the CJS.” (Ben, 328-332) 
Furthermore, on an individual basis, the CJS was described as particularly 
detrimental to those with mental health problems. The stress of a trial was perceived 
to be particularly aversive, due to these clients’ reduced ability to manage stress. 
With the exception of Jess, all participants felt that the CJS was not the appropriate 
place to deal with these clients, and expressed a wish for diversion to community 
care:  
“Criminal prosecution I don’t think is the answer in a huge amount of these 
cases […] Where they're first-time offenders, where the damage done is minimal, 
when no harm, no real harm has been caused, I would like to see a divergent where 
they don’t get like a record.” (Lee, 25–42) 
While such diversion schemes exist, several participants identified recent cuts to 
these services. Courts reportedly only had a staffed mental health team one day a 
week, resulting in the stress and expense of adjournments for some clients, and 
deprivation of liberty to others remanded in custody whilst they waited for the 
appointed day. 
Joe and Tina both described the CJS as a kind of proxy for an ill-resourced 
community care system, “where [defendants] have to gather a conviction and be 
dealt with as a criminal before services engage.” (Joe, 542–544). This led to 
uncomfortable questions about barristers’ duty of care for such clients, and whether 
by defending their case forcefully, they risked the client’s overall welfare: 
 “Sometimes even you’re thinking, should I get the prosecution to drop it? 
Because, if they do, then that’s the end of it, whereas if they carry on, maybe we can 
get probation intervention. So, there just doesn’t seem to be enough service really.” 
(Tina, 32-36) 
Participants also recognised the process of criminalisation, whereby mental health 
related behaviours are not treated within health systems, but are instead punished in 
criminal courts. All participants felt that mental health problems had directly led to a 
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prosecution for at least some of their clients, and served as a contributing factor to 
many others; for example: 
“Interviewer: So to what extent do you think mental health difficulties have led 
to your clients being arrested? 
Ben: well (.) To a very great extent frankly, it comes back to that issue of the 
criminal justice system not being designed as a mental health system, but being 
used as it.” (Ben, 74 – 78)) 
However, whilst the barristers may have viewed their clients as less culpable, this did 
not make them less criminally responsible. It was acknowledged that mental health 
needs do not generally provide a defence, e.g.: “it’s not a defence to beating 
someone up that you have Asperger’s.” (Jess, 539–546) 
As a group, the barristers were critical of the very function of the CJS, recognising 
that they wished to help both their clients and society at large, and the tensions of 
working for a system that comprehensively failed to do so. Only Jess did not 
comment on this dilemma, perhaps for the previously discussed reasons that she did 
not think about her client’s mental health.  
 ILL RESOURCED 
Alongside working within a flawed system, poor pressures added to barristers’ 
professional anxiety. These included a lack of training and guidance, feeling 
stressed, and not supported. These are discussed in turn. 
3.2.2.1 LACK OF TRAINING AND GUIDANCE  
None of the barristers in this study had received any training whatsoever in mental 
health. Most of them identified this as a concern, suggesting a range of topics that 
they would like training in, given the opportunity. Those who held a more medicalised 
perspective on mental health thought training in diagnostic categories might be 
helpful, for example:  
“I would have thought some form of training on how to handle people, how to 
recognise certain illnesses, and if you can recognise the illnesses, how to cope with 
those individuals and their illnesses” (Max, 45–49). 
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Those with a more contextualised perspective still thought it would be helpful to be 
given guidance on how to identify those who might have additional needs, for 
example, Jen’s conceptualisation of the vulnerable client: 
“The vulnerable client maybe should be covered as a topic, once practitioners 
decide they are going down a particular route, simply in terms of, here is most of 
humanity you’ll be dealing with, here is a group or a particular set of traits that you 
should look out for and when you see these traits, you may need to consider reacting 
more like this” (Jen, 407–414) 
Most participants recognised that without training, their clients’ needs might not be 
fully met, and were concerned about the lack of professional guidance, feeling 
unclear about their obligations. Furthermore, barristers themselves were left ill 
resourced: “I think really, it’s just a huge gap in education, training and support in 
dealing with, yeah some just horrifically tragic sets of circumstances” (Max, 25-27).  
One participant, Jess, was more hesitant about offering training, feeling concerned 
about the potential dangers of barristers ending up diagnosing clients: 
“Reactions in those kinds of conditions, could be misinterpreted, possibly by, 
you know, over-eager barristers who are, not, not particularly well aware of what 
they’re looking for and, are suddenly put into some training and being primed to look 
for an aggressive defendant, or someone who appears very upset.” (Jess, 143-148)  
She felt that barristers should only concern themselves with legal matters, which as 
discussed earlier, may have helped to preserve her own mental wellbeing. 
Max explained that in addition to the lack of training, there were environmental 
barriers to barristers identifying mental health needs, with little confidential space: 
“[There] may be one room for the whole building, to go and sit and have a 
private conversation. So often, the instructions are taken on the seats outside of the 
courtroom,” (Max, 1009–1011) 
3.2.2.2 STRESS AND PRESSURE 
All participants described the enormous stress and pressure of the work, which was 
often compounded when dealing with clients with mental health needs: 
 
 
 
68 
 
“(Junior barristers) spend most of their time doing cases that are 
underprepared, that they received at the last minute […] they arrive early at court, 
[…] But of course sometimes your client, who is struggling with stress and anxiety, 
doesn’t arrive until half nine, quarter to, you try to get them to immediately focus on 
the thing at hand, they want to talk to you about a number of different issues and the 
stress ramps up. So you go into the courtroom, because the case is called on, you 
say that you need further time and you get into, the court immediately demands to 
know why this hasn’t been done, and there’s no answer to that other than, we’re 
poorly funded, overworked, and we just got the papers at very late notice.” (Lee, 61–
79) 
The above extract illustrates a number of pressures on barristers, including the 
increasing financial pressures caused by cuts to legal aid, the lack of time to 
prepare, and huge workload; none of which is received sympathetically by the court, 
which is under its own pressure. Additionally, barristers are expected to, “basically 
sort of learn on the job. It’s learning through experience,” (Matt, 10-11), which means 
their first cases in the MC are particularly stressful. Some participants explained that 
these difficulties were recognised by neither the court nor the profession, “I just think 
there’s no appreciation of how difficult it is whatsoever.” (Lee, 168–169) 
3.2.2.3 LACK OF SUPPORT 
Many barristers spoke with regret about the lack of emotional support in the 
profession. Lee described that whilst legal advice was offered, “I didn’t feel that those 
offers extended to, call me if you need to chat, and just vent,” (191–192). Matt, Lee, 
Ben, and Max all identified this as, “a problem” (646, Matt), and felt:  
“The impact of dealing with clients with mental health difficulties on young 
barristers and young advocates I think that something that’s not, not enough 
attention is paid to.” (Lee, 28-31) 
Max explained that if you were prepared to self-identify as struggling, some kind of 
professional support was available; but that due to stigma, taking this up would very 
likely compromise one’s career:  
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“In terms of professional standing, if you’re someone that has had a nervous 
breakdown, been an alcoholic, any of those kinds of things, all of a sudden it will be, 
well that person can’t cope, it’s not good enough.” (Max, 479–483)  
 RESPONSIBILITY  
Many participants recognised the myriad social issues that their clients faced, and 
that “the kind of people that we’re dealing with are from disadvantaged 
backgrounds,” (Tina, 20–21). This compounded the sense of responsibility they held 
for their clients, which when trial outcomes were not favourable, could be very 
distressing: 
“I used to go home thinking that I, I was somehow to blame for my client being 
convicted, despite the fact that the evidence was overwhelming.” (Lee, 424–444) 
Several participants described a duty of care beyond the trial itself, feeling 
responsible for the client’s overall welfare despite often lacking the means to address 
this. This sense of responsibility was intensified when clients were not able to give 
instructions, as described by Jen:  
“The most impressive and also the most terrifying part of my job is that 
someone effectively goes, “here is my life, please don’t squish it, and don’t drop it,”  
and when you’ve got someone who’s handing their life over to you, and isn’t giving 
you any direction you go, oh [laughter], right. Where do we start?” (Jen, 391–396) 
Several participants linked these feelings of responsibility to their values and 
motivations, ”I think there’s a certain sort of person who goes into criminal law over 
the others, and that’s the person who’s got a bit of a stronger social conscience,” 
(Jen, 712–715). Several described their wish to help people, “I did [this job] because 
I really care about what I do, I really really care about being able to defend people 
that can’t look after themselves,” (Max, 329–333). Others named feelings of empathy 
and care as crucial to the role, “if you’re not doing this job out of a sense of empathy 
then, (.) or at least with a sense of empathy, then why are you doing it?” (Ben 263–
266). Jen described how as an advocate, one should be prepared to put in extra 
work for one’s clients:  
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“I think if you’re prepared as an advocate, or as a solicitor, representing 
someone who’s not well, who needs a bit more care, if you’re prepared to put the 
time in and take a bit of a beating from the court, I think that’s much better for the 
client in the long run.” (Jen, 243–246) 
 ILLUSION OF CONFIDENCE  
Linked to their lack of training and guidance, and relative juniority, most of the 
participants described feeling underprepared and unconfident about working with 
clients with mental health needs. Many expressed worries and concern, e.g.: 
“Interviewer: What was it that frightened you about that client?  
Jen: I felt like it was possibly beyond my competence […] I didn’t know 
whether I could actually do a good enough job, with her in that state […] Maybe 
frightened was the wrong word, I think it’s sort of anxiety, professional anxiety.” (Jen, 
377 – 398) 
Yet, several participants explained that it was a career where you needed to appear 
confident, e.g., “that’s part of the profession, that we don’t let someone see how little 
we might know,” (Ben, 91–92). All participants described that a strong relationship 
with the client was crucial to the case, and Ben felt that appearing confident was part 
of this.  
Some participants said this confidence was important for winning the case, too, with 
Matt describing how seeming otherwise, “can give your opponent a sort of 
advantage […] they’ll just steam roller you,” (706–708). Similarly, Ben said, 
“In order to get anywhere you have to make other barristers think that you’re 
competent and a lot of how you can win things in court is just based on bluster and 
appearing to know you saying and making someone else think that they don’t know 
what they’re saying.” (132–137) 
This extract also illustrates the importance of appearing competent in front of other 
barristers, a point raised by other participants. Admitting to a lack of confidence 
could have serious consequences for your career:  
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“Because you might genuinely not feel comfortable but […] if there’s an 
adjournment for not a good reason, the solicitors might get wasted costs, they might 
never instruct you again, your practice will go down a little bit, and it’s, again, it’s not 
actually the worst thing in the world sometimes […] but when you’re sort of, just 
coming into it, it can feel like it is the worst thing in the world.” (Matt, 637–646) 
Similarly, Max described that in such a tough work environment, barristers were 
focused on survival, and to admit vulnerability would mean others felt you weren’t cut 
out for the job: 
 “l think that’s the survival atmosphere of, I’m coping, and I go home at night 
sometimes and feel like, you know, feel horrendous from my day’s work and if you 
can’t hack it, then you, you shouldn’t probably be doing this job.” (Max, 498–506)  
 CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS  
This subtheme is characterised by the barristers feeling stuck between opposing 
obligations: to the court or the client, to the defence or their overall welfare. Whilst 
attempting to act in their client’s best interests, due to the difficulties outlined above, 
they often felt unsure about what these were. 
 Many barristers were faced with a dilemma when clients did not give instructions: 
“As a barrister you literally act on your instructions, and when you’ve got a 
client who can’t give you anything more sensible than, the Catholic Church are 
conspiring with the paedophiles I just (4) you’re pretty much left on your own.” (Jen, 
365–388) 
Tina felt more professional guidance should be given in this respect, feeling unclear 
about her obligations: 
“I don’t think it’s made clear when you’re doing your bar training what exactly 
it is you’re supposed to do in that situation. Because you can’t take any instructions 
from that person so are […] you given free rein to just do whatever you think is the 
best for that client? Or, is there some sort of limit to what you should be doing?” 
(Tina, 67–74) 
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Many participants described conflicting obligations to the court and to their client. If 
barristers felt their clients were too unwell to plead, but the client did not agree, the 
barristers could be left in a, “a bit of a no-man’s land,” (Matt, 216); between their 
obligation to follow the client’s instructions, and a duty of care. Joe described how in 
court, “sometimes everyone will use kind of coded language,” (107) and Jen similarly 
said, “you end up talking in riddles,” (186) or:  
“You have to hope that they behave in such a mad way, as soon as you get 
into court, that you can then legitimately say that I have a real concern without 
having to raise it with them directly.” (Jen, 559 – 565) 
In the above extract, Jen described this as, “the chicken’s way out” (563), illustrating 
a feeling shared by many participants: that that there is often no comfortable solution 
to these dilemmas; elsewhere Jen describes this as, “you’re slightly damned if you 
do and damned if you don’t,” (128). 
Several participants described an “impasse,” (Lee, 377) in this conflict between the 
duty to the court, and to their client, 
“You have this kind of impasse which is completely illogical, completely 
irrational […] after all it’s not your purpose to tell them what to do, and that comes up 
all the time, just blunt irrationality at like, a deep level.” (Joe, 205–211) 
Participants described weighing up a range of issues to determine what might be in 
their client’s best interests, and described a tension between attempting to think 
about this more holistically, and presenting the most forceful defence: 
“It’s very difficult for a lot, for a lot of lawyers to know what to do because 
without a strong feeling, you wonder whether you’re working against the interests of 
your own clients, and you’re damaging your relationship with them, by suggesting 
against their interests that they should go and see a doctor.” (Joe, 73–79) 
In addition to the concerns about outcomes raised earlier, Joe questioned whether 
his specific input in the trial might be detrimental. He wondered whether presenting a 
forceful defence might further serve to entrench someone’s bizarre behaviour:  
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“Am I pretending that, that what they’re doing is okay or that they have a case 
to answer, because [the defendant] may well have thought, well Mr [Joe’s 
surname]’s  argued this really forcefully so it is okay, whereas what he probably 
needed was more people telling him, you can’t do this, or, why are you doing this?” 
(Joe, 928–934) 
Two of the participants seemed to hold a different perspective to the other barristers. 
Jess seemed to be the least conflicted about her obligations; followed by Jen, who 
named anxieties but fundamentally felt clear that her primary duty as an advocate 
was to protect her clients. For Jen, the act of fighting for vulnerable clients confirmed 
her value as someone with a social conscience; whereas Jess’ behaviour was 
aligned with her the values she privileged, such as confidentiality. Jess’ lack of 
“professional anxiety” may also connect to the way she has chosen to manage the 
stress and distress of work in the MC.  
3.3 SUMMARY OF THEMES 
Broadly, participants conceptualised mental health from either a contextualised or 
medicalised position; but with the exception of Tina, were aware of and resisted 
paternalism. However, they expressed limits to their role in facilitating autonomy, 
weighing this against a duty to protect the public, and a duty of care to their clients. 
Most participants described distress at working in these systems, which could at 
times be overwhelming. 
Most participants were well aware of issues in the CJS, and how these could pose 
particular disadvantages to those with mental health problems. Linked to their 
feelings of responsibility for these clients, participants did their best to mitigate the 
harm of these systems, and manage very high levels of distress and risk. One 
participant, Jess, held a notably different account on these themes. She expressed 
little “professional anxiety,” and rather than attempt to make up for the shortfalls of 
the wider system, instead worked within the role prescribed of her. Whilst it is 
possible that this may have led to worse outcomes for her clients, she expressed 
much less stress and distress; perhaps illustrating an adaptive response to the 
impossible task of mitigating the harm of the CJS. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
Research findings are considered with respect to theory, followed by an evaluation of 
this research. 
4.1 DISCUSSION OF THEMES AND LITERATURE 
As an exploratory study, the research questions were necessarily broad: 
How do barristers work with psychological distress throughout the Magistrates’ Court 
process?  
1. How do barristers construct mental health, and what experience do they have 
of working with clients who they perceive to have a mental health difficulty? 
2. How do barristers defend clients who they perceive to have a mental health 
difficulty, and how do they work with their clients’ associated distress?  
3. How might a mental health difficulty influence the outcome of the court case, 
from the perspective of the defence barrister? 
As stated in the introduction, the court process refers to the barristers’ involvement in 
meeting the client shortly before the trial, how they are worked with and represented 
in court, and how outcomes may be influenced by perceived mental health 
difficulties. The title and the research questions were devised in reference to the 
distress of defendants. However, as the analysis has elucidated, the barristers’ own 
distress is also an item of interest, and will be considered. 
Due to this breadth and the limitations of the word count, points arising are 
addressed within an overall discussion of the themes, rather than structured by 
question. Broadly, research question one is addressed within “construction of mental 
health” and then throughout. For question two, strategic issues are mostly contained 
within “working with mental health difficulties,” and managing distress within the aptly 
named, “working with clients’ distress” section. Question three is considered from a 
systemic perspective in, “systematic disadvantage of those with mental health 
needs,” with speculation about the influence of barristers’ own actions outlined in 
“working with mental health difficulties.” The considerable, worrying levels of distress 
expressed by barristers is discussed within “professional anxiety and barristers’ 
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distress” and then further in “burnout.” Finally, ethical issues are considered as well 
as recommendations from this research. 
 CONSTRUCTION OF MENTAL HEALTH 
Participants varied in what they considered to be a mental health problem. Some 
participants seemed to be talking about only very significant difficulties such as 
psychosis. These participants attributed stress and anxiety to the courtroom process 
itself. Others included a range of difficulties that included experiences of anxiety and 
depression, acknowledging that these might interact with the stress of the court 
case, but not be wholly attributed to it. The interview questions imposed the 
construct “mental health difficulty,” without explicitly inviting other conceptualisations 
of their clients’ experience, for example of “distress” or “emotional difficulties.” This 
may have influenced participants’ responses and is discussed further in the 
“evaluation of current research” section below, under, “the impact of interview 
questions.” 
None of the participants described a criminalising perspective (immoral, deserve 
punishment, Peter & Schneider, 1992), which seems reasonable, given their purpose 
was to defend their clients. Instead, participants tended to be more committed to 
either a medicalising or contextualising account of their clients’ distress. Participants 
who occupied more of a medicalising position were inclined to construe their clients’ 
difficulties as an illness. As discussed in the introduction, a medicalising narrative is 
predominant in our culture and particularly in the CJS (Gerard, 1986, Leslie et al., 
2007, Hall, Miraglia, & Li-Wen, 2011). This was reflected in the participants’ accounts 
that in the courtroom, distress needed to be legitimised by medical diagnosis. 
Other participants appeared to speak from more of a contextualising position, 
conceptually similar to psychological formulation; and situated their clients’ difficulties 
within a psychosocial context (Johnstone, 2011). Perhaps these differing positions 
can be explained by their chronic exposure to both their clients’ social disadvantage, 
and the medicalising courtroom narrative. It should be noted that these constructs 
are only heuristically presented as a dichotomy; whilst all participants appeared to 
speak more from one position or the other, most expressed occasional views from 
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the other position. Dualism is generally an artefact of research, simplifying 
individuals’ nuanced and heterogeneous beliefs (Kvale, 1992).; nonetheless, it is 
presented here as such in the interests of parsimony.  
 WORKING WITH CLIENTS’ MENTAL HEALTH DIFFICULTIES 
The analysis considered how barristers worked with their clients’ mental health 
throughout the courtroom process, including how it was identified, used or not used 
as a defence strategy, and how associated distress was managed within the 
courtroom. Participants varied in the extent to which they actively used mental health 
as part of the defence, and allowed or restricted their clients’ autonomy. Some 
participants felt strongly that Magistrates held prejudicial attitudes towards those with 
mental health difficulties and attempted to keep disclosures from the court, whilst 
others did not feel this was an issue. Several participants were ambivalent about 
assuming responsibility for their clients, and resisted paternalism; aware of the 
restrictive nature of hospital orders, they were careful not to seek treatment at any 
cost. One participant, unclear about her obligations, assumed responsibility for her 
clients and attempted to persuade them of their need for treatment, in a somewhat 
paternalistic manner. 
Previous, realist research on lawyers related the construction of mental health to 
distinct typologies of defence strategy (Laberge & Morin, 2001). As this research 
comes from a critical realist epistemological position, it is not valid to make truth 
claims about how these constructs led the barristers to particular actions. However, 
the adoption of a medicalising or contextualising position did appear to limit, or open 
up, options for barristers in conversations with their client. It is speculated here that 
that adoption of one or other position may have led to different conversations, and 
therefore differing identification of mental health. Participants speaking from a 
contextualising position seemed to find it easier to elicit a disclosure of mental health 
than those adopting a more medicalised view of distress. Rather than masking their 
difficulties, as suggested by some of the participants, research suggests that 
nondisclosure is related to holding a non-medical view of distress (Irvine, 2011). 
Clients may have denied “mental health problems” as they simply did understood 
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their difficulties as such; whereas they may have agreed they had stress or worry. 
One participant never asked her clients about mental health, and they never brought 
it up, potentially leading to worrying under-identification of needs in her clients. 
Perhaps by not having these conversations she protected her own psychological 
health, discussed further below in “context and mechanisms of role conflict.” 
The potential for paternalism within the barrister-client relationship, and that mental 
health needs may not be identified, is troubling. Paternalism can be elicited from 
traditional models of psychiatry. Whilst aiming to improve the health and care of 
those with mental health difficulties, it may simultaneously subjugate their autonomy 
(Pelto-Piri, Engström, & Engström, 2013). Equally, completely neglecting to ask 
about mental health could deprive clients of a defence, impede engagement with the 
trial, prevent access to support for those who want it, and lead to more punitive 
sentencing. These are serious implications for defendants, potentially depriving them 
of a fundamental human right: the right to a fair trial (Sieghart, 1983).  
Whilst diagnosis comes with its own problems, clients should be offered the 
opportunity to use these labels for their defence, if they feel the benefits are worth 
the cost. For example, should the client consent to having their difficulties 
constructed medically and receiving a diagnosis, it could be entered as mitigating 
evidence for sentencing, and in limited cases, offer a defence in its own right. 
However, this needs to be suggested from a position of autonomy, not paternalism; 
with barristers respecting the client’s right to make unwise decisions. This is a 
complex issue, but clients stand to lose if barristers are not able to have these 
discussions.  
To name these issues is not an attempt to castigate these barristers, who had their 
client’s best interests at heart at all times, and lacked both training and guidance to 
meet their needs. Systemic changes are needed, so that barristers are made aware 
of both their professional responsibilities and their limits, and receive training to apply 
this in practice.  
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 CONTEXT AND MECHANISMS OF ROLE CONFLICT 
Szasz argued that it was more honest to label social deviancy as such, rather than 
mental illness, and that the state should restrict its powers of control to the law 
(Ennis & Szasz, 1972, Pelto-Piri et al., 2013). As some participants identified, 
running the trial (rather than using fitness to plead proceedings) afforded their clients 
more rights than risking the indeterminate restriction imposed by a hospital order. To 
a great extent, Szasz’ ideals are indeed being played out in the MC, with the great 
majority of clients undiagnosed (Department of Health, 2009), and instead treated as 
criminals. Yet most participants regarded this process of criminalisation as 
fundamentally unethical, punishing social disadvantage, and providing no benefit to 
society.  
Participants reported conflicted feelings about their place within this flawed system. 
An inability to meet the contradictory demands of both the court and wider CJS, and 
their client, may have led to a state of role conflict, where employees are pulled 
between multiple incompatible roles and which is associated with distress (Maslach, 
2003).  Self-perception theory offers an explanation of a psychological mechanism 
between behaviour, role conflict and distress, and suggests that we judge our sense 
of self by our actions (Bem, 1972). If we deem our behaviour as conflicting with our 
sense of self, we feel distressed. According to this theory, participants who felt they 
were acting against their values would have been more likely to judge themselves 
negatively, and feel distressed; with those unclear about the right action to take left 
feeling similarly unclear about their sense of self. This was supported by the data, 
with participants who expressed more conflicting views also likely to express 
considerable distress.  
When forced to act contrary to their values, for self-preservation individuals often 
resort to changing their beliefs to match their behaviour; termed cognitive 
dissonance (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003). Changing one’s beliefs protects 
one’s self-image, and resolves the associated sense of internal conflict. Yet, despite 
consequences to their psychological health, most participants did not seem to 
employ cognitive dissonance, and were acutely aware of their sense of conflict. This 
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may be partially explained by their professional training. A barrister’s role involves 
considering multiple perspectives, and all sides of an argument, so that they can 
present the best defence. Their professional capacity to hold ambivalence, whilst 
fundamental to their work, may mean they experience greater internal conflict. The 
emotional implications of this are discussed below.  
 PROFESSIONAL ANXIETY AND BARRISTERS’ DISTRESS  
In addition to managing the long hours and stressful environment of the MC whilst 
inexperienced and junior, barristers have to manage the high emotional demands of 
working with vulnerable clients. Their resources to meet the emotional needs of 
these clients were diminished by the lack of professional training and guidance 
available to them. Participants described considerable role conflict, attempting to 
offer more support than they could emotionally manage, and additionally working 
within a system with which most of them disagreed, and considered deeply flawed. 
Most reported significant distress, particularly at the beginning of their career when 
more junior. Whilst some practical support was available, emotional support was not. 
The occupational model of stress, which posits that when job demands are high and 
the resources are low, role strain emerges; suggests that barristers are likely to feel 
stressed and distressed by this working environment (Bergin & Jimmieson, 2013). 
Participants described deeply held feelings of responsibility for their clients, working 
very hard to meet their needs. High role conflict and emotional demands are the 
strongest predictors of future psychological distress (Johannessen, Tynes, & Sterud, 
2013), with the risk of role strain greatest for those doing their utmost to meet the 
emotional demands of their clients (Maslach, 2003). Consistent with this theory, 
participants described a high level of distress; and several described feelings of 
exhaustion, a component of burnout (discussed further below). Working against 
one’s values, role conflict, high workload, and insufficient control over resources are 
all risk factors for burnout, placing barristers at a high risk (Maslach, 2003). 
Their distress may have been mediated by the perceived professional inaccessibility 
of, or unacceptability of seeking, emotional support. This may be a consequence of 
their prolonged period of professional socialisation, and its consequent signifiers that 
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emotional suppression is necessary (Harris, 2002). The belief that suppressing 
emotion is an inherent aspect of professionalism is suggested by the idea described 
in theme two: that seeking support meant you were not cut out from the job; and also 
in theme one: that distress was something you were meant to just get used to. 
Repression of emotion independently increases exhaustion, and consequent burnout 
(Lazányi, 2010). Furthermore, an inability to share their emotional lives with peers 
deprives barristers of an important coping strategy and may increase distress, as the 
relationship between role strain and burnout is mediated by a lack of social support 
and community resources (Maslach, 2003). However, without further research with 
barristers, this is merely speculation. 
 BURNOUT 
Whilst the research did not specifically set out to measure this, many participants 
reported experiences akin to burnout, such as exhaustion. Burnout is a state of 
psychological stress, and has been conceptualised as a combination of emotional 
exhaustion, depersonalisation, and lowering of personal accountability and 
motivation (Maslach, 2003).  For the reasons outlined above, working with clients 
with mental health needs may substantially increase the risk of burnout for barristers. 
But alongside their own emotional health, barristers risk harm to their clients.  
Burnout may lead to poorer decision-making due to depleted cognitive resources 
(Fischman, 2008). In an attempt to reduce the emotional burden upon them, 
individuals who are burnt out may begin treating others as objects rather than people 
(Maslach, 2003). This is “depersonalisation,” and was identified by one participant in 
theme one, who said the cost of chronic over demand on resources may be that one 
no longer cares. This feeling of depersonalisation, and the additional effects of 
lowered personal accountability and motivation, may account for the unethical 
behaviour reported by one participant in theme one. He described that under 
immense financial pressures, barristers were motivated to work unethically, perhaps 
unlawfully. General strain theory predicts that strain is produced by role conflict, 
overload, and financial concerns; and that where there is no legitimate opportunity to 
reduce strain, crime will result (Langton & Piquero, 2007). This relationship is 
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mediated by low social support (Langton & Piquero, 2007), which was reported by 
these participants as a consequence of their professional socialisation;  and by the 
erosion of ideals and depersonalisation that is associated with burnout (Shahzad & 
Mahmood, 2012). Under such strain, barristers may resort to working unethically; 
motivated by finances, rather than the best interests of their clients. 
Participants reported that representing clients with mental health needs required time 
and work that they would be unlikely to be compensated for. Either as a direct 
consequence of their mental health difficulties, or because of factors associated with 
related socio-economic deprivation and exclusion, these clients may be less likely to 
be less able to advocate for themselves (Durkan, 2009). As a group, clients with 
mental health difficulties are therefore at a high risk of receiving unethical practice 
from barristers, as a consequence of burnout.  
 WORKING WITH CLIENTS’ DISTRESS 
As outlined above, participants described the significant emotional impact of dealing 
with distress. They clearly identified a lack of resources to manage this, with almost 
all desiring training on the best way to engage with, and manage these clients. Many 
were left feeling “like a social worker,”10 juggling multiple roles, but without 
supervision or support to prevent them feeling overly responsible or to process their 
distress, contributing to the role conflict outlined earlier. 
Interestingly, despite feeling unskilled at managing their clients’ distress, the 
responses from most participants in this study indicated a high level of emotional 
astuteness and sensitivity. This may reflect a sampling bias (discussed later), but 
may also be related to the disempowering effects of a medicalised narrative of 
distress. Agendas such as, “mental health literacy” acknowledge that public beliefs 
about distress differ from psychiatric constructions, and privileging expert over lay 
perspectives, seek to educate and inform the public of a medical model (Jorm, 
2000). This has been described as the domination of medical authority. Emotional 
distress is removed from the public realm, and put on a plane where only medical 
                                            
P(Lee, 71), as quoted on pg. 53 
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experts can legitimately discuss it (Peter & Schneider, 1992). This may have 
influenced one participant’s account of feeling disempowered, and that mental health 
should be left to “experts.” Barristers may be empowered by access to a 
psychological account of a spectrum of distress, which demands interpersonal, 
rather than expert, skills. 
Participants identified that their clients with mental health needs could have 
significant communication issues, which could again infringe upon their right to a fair 
trial. Unlike the Crown court, intermediaries are not provided for defendants with 
communication difficulties, thus many participants put in extra work to make sure that 
their client understood the trial11. Other difficulties reported by the participants 
included clients acquiescing, difficulties processing large amounts of information, 
and apparently illogical or confusing statements. This led to participants finding it 
difficult to ensure that their client fully understood the case, necessary for the 
participant to establish before they could take instructions (i.e. a plea of guilty or not 
guilty). It also meant some clients had trouble understanding the trial proceedings as 
they happened. This reflects research that found a high level of speech and 
language difficulties in young offenders ((Bryan, 2004), there is little research with 
adults). Barristers are not given any training in identifying communication difficulties, 
which is concerning, as if these are missed clients may not understand what is 
happening in court; or more worryingly, simply agree to whatever the barrister says.  
Barristers additionally described various difficulties in engaging clients with mental 
health difficulties. This included significant difficulties in obtaining instructions when 
their client was very distressed. For example, the barrister might need to present the 
client with considerable information on the evidence against them, which the client 
might struggle to process. Participants described the most unusual behaviour as the 
most difficult to work with, perhaps by virtue of its very unusualness, and their 
inexperience in managing this. However, these clients are likely to come under the 
diagnostic label of psychosis or schizophrenia, diagnoses often associated with 
public attitudes of fear, unpredictability and dangerousness (Angermeyer & 
                                            
11 N.B. Although they cannot provide equivalent support, e.g. sitting in the box. 
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Matschinger, 2003). Whether consciously or unconsciously, these societal narratives 
may have influenced participants’ perceptions. Medical explanations have been 
shown to increase stigma (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 2003). Conversely, training in 
a psychological account of, for example, hearing voices, may help barristers to 
normalise these experiences, and to feel more confident about meeting their clients’ 
needs. 
A final consequence of the above is that these clients take additional time, which 
was not received sympathetically by the pressured MC; discussed further below.  
 SYSTEMATIC DISADVANTAGE OF THOSE WITH MENTAL HEALTH 
NEEDS 
Multiple levels of systemic disadvantage may compromise the defence of people 
with mental health difficulties. This thesis has focussed on the barristers’ 
experiences, rather than the system, and therefore this is presented only briefly. 
Participants explained defendants were particularly vulnerable to the time and 
financial pressures of the MC, and may: suffer undue pressure to enter a guilty plea; 
be offered no representation at all; face a trial that is unfairly biased towards a 
prosecution; or work with junior barristers who may not be sufficiently experienced to 
manage their case. Overwhelmingly, participants described ignorance and 
discrimination from court staff, and felt they needed comprehensive training in 
mental health. 
Given the current interest in reform of the CJS for those with mental health needs 
(May, 2014), barristers are an obvious group to consult with, as they can offer a view 
from the inside. Yet the literature on diversion and liaison schemes rarely mention 
the defence, nor do working groups on reform (e.g. Durkan, Saunders, & Hazard, 
2009). This research suggests barristers have important insights, and that their 
views should be taken into consideration in any reform. 
 ETHICAL ISSUES 
Researchers are obliged to consider the ethical implications of their work (American 
Psychological Association, 1973), and this study raises multiple issues. One 
question concerns the extent to which barristers should be responsible for the 
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identification of mental health. I have suggested that due to the failures of the system 
to identify these needs, barristers make have a crucial role in doing so, and may 
potentially otherwise compromise the human rights of their clients. Yet they are 
already exceptionally overworked, feel overly-responsible and emotionally strained 
by the work, and are at potential risk of significant psychological harm in the form of 
burnout. Is it ethical to suggest they take on a further duty? Ultimately, this is not a 
question that can be answered by this thesis; it concerns the barristers’ role within 
the CJS, which needs to be addressed by their professional body. What is certainly 
not ethical is the current situation, where barristers are left to fulfil this role by default, 
without training or support. Their voice is neglected in the vast majority of the 
literature on reform of the CJS for those with mental health needs, despite their 
crucial role in forming the client’s defence. There is a pressing need for their work 
with clients with mental health difficulties to be recognised and taken seriously, as 
there may otherwise be significant implications for both the well-being of barristers, 
and their ability to provide effective defence for these clients. 
Amongst the need for general mental health training, it is particularly alarming that 
these barristers did not appear to have sufficient training in risk assessment. Whilst 
knowing the procedure for overt disclosures, their comments suggest that they are 
unclear about what needs to be taken seriously, nor are they clear on how best to 
ask clients about risk. Furthermore, many participants expressed that they were 
sometimes at risk of violence or aggression, and again appeared to lack any training 
to deal with this. As discussed, detailed risk assessment itself is surely beyond the 
role of a barrister; but as a minimum, they should be provided with basic training 
aimed at keeping themselves safe, and when they should ask for a mental health 
assessment (e.g. veiled threats should always be followed up).  
Where clients meet the criteria of unfit to plead (which is similar to not having 
capacity), some participants felt the best defence strategy was for them to assume 
responsibility for that client, and fight the case on their behalf. Participants made 
compelling arguments as to why this would be a preferable strategy, but this is 
ethically contentious. It involves one individual attempting to weigh up the best 
interests of that client and taking responsibility for that decision; and whilst it perhaps 
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seems obvious that by presenting the most forceful defence for the client’s freedom 
would be in their best interests, there is a danger that other factors could be 
neglected (e.g. the inherent trauma of that person taking part in a trial). In 
healthcare, if someone lacks capacity, there are appropriate safeguards (e.g. best 
interest meetings), professionals are bound by the Mental Capacity Act (Department 
of Health, 2005), and there is considerable guidance on how to proceed (e.g. Jones, 
2005). For barristers, this appears to be a huge grey area, with no guidance 
whatsoever. As some participants stated, it is unclear whether they have “free reign” 
to simply do what they think is best for that client; arguably, this is dangerous and 
potentially unethical. The professional body should make barristers’ responsibilities 
clear in this circumstance.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, this research makes the following recommendations. 
The emotional health of barristers is severely neglected by both the research 
literature, the CJS, and the profession itself. Indeed, this was not a primary focus of 
this thesis12, and their high risk for burnout was an unexpected finding (there is no 
other literature on the emotional well-being of UK barristers). Further research 
should investigate this as a primary focus. Their contact with very distressed and 
traumatised individuals, alongside reviewing horrific evidence, demands system level 
changes in the provision of emotional support. Alongside the implications for 
barristers, if these issues are not addressed, the financially motivated unethical 
behaviour discussed earlier may result in miscarriages of justice for their clients, with 
those who are vulnerable most likely to suffer. 
Providing adequate training in mental health and risk assessment may also help 
barristers to feel better resourced, which may reduce their feelings of role strain, and 
consequent risk of burnout. Furthermore, it has been suggested here that not 
providing this training may mean mental health issues are not identified, potentially 
                                            
12 The literature on burnout is presented in the introduction for readability, but in fact was only 
researched after the data was analysed 
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compromising defendants’ human rights to a fair trial. Equally when needs are 
identified and barristers, lacking guidance, assume responsibility for their clients; 
there is a risk of subjugation of autonomy and paternalism. Professional guidance is 
urgently needed as to barristers’ responsibilities, and the limits to these. Training 
from a psychological perspective, rather than a medicalised perspective, may help 
barristers feel more confident in applying the interpersonal skills that they already 
have, and reduce any stigma or fear. The perspectives of the barristers in this study 
suggests that they would be open to such an approach. 
Clinical psychology can offer an alternative perspective to the dichotomy of 
criminalisation and punishment versus medicalisation and paternalism. Whilst these 
paradigms lend themselves to individualised models of distress, a third option is to 
consider the economic, social, and family factors that might contribute to offending, 
and work on a more systemic level to reduce these. Furthermore, whilst not a 
particular focus of this research, much of what the participants identified as troubling 
were about systemic issues, such as cuts to legal aid. Clinical psychology arguably 
has a role in preventing distress, by tackling its root causes (Patel, 2003). This 
research suggests that established groups such as Psychologists Against Austerity 
(2015) should also encompass vulnerable people within the CJS, and attempt to 
address the levels of deprivation that may have contributed to their offending. 
Finally, almost all participants highlighted that people with mental health difficulties 
were particularly vulnerable to courtroom prejudice and ignorance, and the time 
pressured MC. Advocating for their clients’ needs was often very difficult in this 
context. Barristers’ ideas should be taken into account by CJS reform groups, as the 
defence counsel’s perspective is crucial. It is also recommended that these issues 
should be looked at in more depth by direct research on the MC itself, and other 
courtroom staff.  
4.2 EVALUATION OF CURRENT RESEARCH 
This chapter concludes with an evaluation of this research, including reference to 
specific criteria to evaluate research, a summary of limitations, and personal 
reflections on the research. 
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This research has been conducted from a critical realist epistemological position. 
From this perspective, knowledge is viewed as being profoundly shaped by 
subjective and cultural perspectives; with truth, knowledge and reality actively 
created by a communal construction and negotiation of meaning (Yardley, 1997). It 
follows that there is therefore no fixed criteria for establishing truth and knowledge 
(as this would constrain the possibilities of truth, or privilege the group whose truth 
criteria is deemed ““correct””), and therefore, a universal code of practice for 
evaluating qualitative research is inherently contradictory of its epistemological 
assumptions13.  
However, in order for research to have any practical utility, its claims need to be 
legitimised somehow. Consequently, it is helpful to have an open-ended and flexible 
framework for the assessment of quality. This research has therefore been evaluated 
with reference to the criteria proposed by Yardley (2000): sensitivity to context, 
coherence, commitment, rigour, transparency, impact and importance. It is 
acknowledged that there are multiple ways to appraise qualitative research and in 
the spirit of pluralism the following does not represent a definitive assessment. 
However, its significant overlap with other proposed criteria14 suggests it may be a 
helpful perspective. Other theory has also been used to augment the evaluation 
where useful. 
 SENSITIVITY TO CONTEXT AND COHERENCE 
These criteria are presented together, as in this research they are related. As a 
clinical psychology trainee, I had a good working knowledge of the constructs of 
mental health and distress that were used to inform interpretations; however, the 
discussion of burnout was an unexpected finding, and consequentially, this literature 
only informed a later stage of analysis; it therefore does not constitute a theme in its 
own right. All qualitative research inherently creates a constructed narrative (Yardley, 
2000), and perhaps this “story” of burnout may have been more evident and 
                                            
13. This is not to say that qualitative research cannot be conducted from a realist position, but a good 
proportion of it (including this study) is not.  
14 e.g. Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon (2003) propose similarly: contribution, defensibility of design, 
credibility, and rigour). 
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coherent in the analysis, had I prior familiarity with this literature, and may have gone 
on to name this as a theme. It was instead drawn out within the discussion. 
Nonetheless, this approach is consistent with the inductive form of research that had 
been planned (Braun & Clarke, 2006). All text has multiple levels of meaning, and 
the definitive reading of a text is ultimately the meaning made by the reader (Barthes 
& Heath, 1977). Arguably, then, to present an analysis that was not organised into 
theory-informed themes meant data was more true to itself, and allowed the theory 
links to instead be articulated transparently within the discussion.  
Finally, the defining sociocultural context for participants was one of professional 
identity, which was interpreted as an important influence on findings of this research. 
However it is acknowledged that my understanding of this context has been reached 
second-hand through the process of consulting a somewhat scanty literature. A 
researcher with more familiarity with the legal world may have been able to offer 
different interpretations, based upon this context. 
 COMMITMENT 
Commitment to the research can be demonstrated by the researcher’s development 
of competence, skill, and immersion in the topic and data (Yardley, 2000). As a 
novice qualitative researcher, my skills in thematic analysis have increased 
exponentially. To this end I have attended teaching, read relevant literature, and 
thought critically about the research process. I gave myself sufficient time to 
immerse myself in the data, including several weeks of analysis; and I have 
attempted to engage with the topic from a variety of perspectives (for example, 
considering how staff construct deviant behaviour on the mental health ward where I 
work). 
 RIGOUR 
Rigour refers to sample adequacy, completeness of the interpretation, and whether 
all variation and complexity has been sufficiently attended to (Yardley, 2000). A 
sample may be considered adequate if it has reached theoretical saturation, the 
point at which new data collection is not generating new insights (Oppong, 2013); in 
this study, this had to be balanced against limited time and resources. Whilst the 
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final participant’s data corresponded to previous themes, there was one further item 
of interest that may have warranted further exploration15. Therefore, for the question 
of sample adequacy, saturation can only be tentatively claimed. Furthermore, one 
participant’s data16 was markedly different from the others, which leads on to the 
next point: selection bias. 
To consider selection bias in this case is to ask, were the people that self-selected 
for this study somehow different to the rest of the target population? Convenience 
sampling was used, which makes bias more likely (Oppong, 2013). To answer this 
question, one needs comparative population-level data which is notably absent for 
barristers, with a dearth of qualitative research in general, and none examining 
mental health. Thus, my hypothesis that the participants were perhaps better 
informed about, and more empathic towards, mental health (than the target 
population of barristers), is not verifiable as such. However, with one exception, all 
participants stated their interest in mental health which I interpreted as a motivation 
for taking part in the study; the remaining participant did not express this, (and from 
other comments, I inferred another motivation for participating). Potentially then, the 
sample predominantly reflects barristers already informed about mental health. 
Moreover, the only participant who did not identify mental health as an interest held 
markedly different views. Arguably, if barristers are generally poorly educated in 
mental health, perhaps her views are actually likely to be the most similar to the 
general population.  
To return to sample adequacy, the question posed is whether these sampling errors 
are small enough not to nullify the conclusions of this study (Oppong, 2013). One 
can consider the second aspect of rigour, completeness of interpretation, in 
answering this question. The analysis has attempted to draw opposing perspectives 
into the analysis, considering “exceptions to the rule” as valuable data. To this end it 
could be argued that even if the target population may be less informed about mental 
                                            
15 Specifically, he extended upon the theme of poor emotional support by stating there was stigma 
within the profession towards psychological distress, which had not been identified by any other 
participant. 
16 Jess 
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health, conclusions can still be generalised about how they might understand and 
work with psychological distress. If they are less aware of mental health than this 
sample, this only amplifies the need for better training, although raises the question 
as to whether this would be so readily welcomed by the profession. Saturation is 
likely to be harder to reach with exploratory research, as previous literature cannot 
provide direction (on e.g. potentially interesting research questions). Thus this thesis 
should be considered a foundation for further research, and meets the criteria of 
rigour relative to the research question and aims: i.e. generating new insights about 
how barristers work with psychological distress. 
Finally, “triangulation” with another source can be a useful way of validating data 
(Yardley, 2000). An obvious source for this study would have been to interview the 
barrister’s clients. This would address an apparent gap in the literature: the lived 
experience of people with mental health difficulties who have to negotiate the MC. 
The time and resource limited nature of this study precluded this, but research in this 
area would be a very helpful perspective, particularly given the current context of 
reform. 
 TRANSPARENCY 
Reflexivity, below, is part of transparency as it allows the reader to understand how 
the researcher’s experiences and values, and the research methods, have impacted 
upon the study conclusions. Alongside detailing the methodology, extracts have 
been provided (Appendix B, H-L).  
 PERSONAL REFLEXIVITY: RESEARCHER AS INTERPRETER 
Qualitative research is an inherently interpretive act. As it is impossible to separate 
the research from the researcher, this relationship must be made transparent, and 
reflected upon (Chamberlain, 2001).  
I chose to do this research having spoken to a friend who had been newly appointed 
as a barrister, and was keen to tell me of his confusion about how to manage some 
very unusual clients, and his dilemmas about how to talk to them about mental 
health without having had any training. I was immediately interested in how he 
managed to have these conversations, and what the implications might be of feeling 
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poorly prepared for a job that demands so much interpersonally. The dearth of 
research spurred me on, and so it was that a casual conversation between friends 
became my thesis.  
Whilst it was incredibly useful to have his contribution in the form of a pilot interview, 
I wonder whether his voice has perhaps framed the questions or content of the 
analysis. Equally, though, the early interviews inevitably shaped the later interviews, 
as I began to notice the same themes recurring. Such is the constructed nature of 
qualitative research from a non-realist position. On this point, unfortunately it is 
impossible to guide the reader about specific factors to take into account when 
reading this research, as it is too multifaceted and complex. I can at least reiterate 
Chamberlain’s (2001) point above: the data was constructed between myself and the 
participants, on the basis of multiple levels of context, including each prior interview.  
I wondered whether the participants identified similarities between themselves and I, 
as they were aware of my status as a doctoral student, and were themselves highly 
educated. I had also come to interview them about a subject that, for the most part, 
they also identified as an interest (mental health). This notion of similarity may have 
helped them to speak freely, as with that feeling comes an expectation of being met 
with understanding. However, it may also have led to unspoken assumptions of 
understanding that were not necessarily correct. For example, that we had a shared 
conception of psychological distress, or shared values of social justice. Fortunately 
for the research, the barristers made exceptional interview participants, and would 
clarify any question they were unsure of; hopefully minimising unintended 
misunderstandings. As one might expect for professional orators, they also seemed 
confident of their opinions. Due to their professional experience of presenting 
controversial opinions, and participants’ expressions that this led to the development 
of a “thick skin,” I felt they were perhaps also less likely to constrain their opinions, 
based on potential negative reactions from me. 
As stated in the introduction, I attempted to interview participants as reflexively as 
possible. I therefore had to consider my own assumptions, as I have had very little 
contact with barristers previously. The very little research available to me cast a 
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somewhat negative light on the profession17 and I was admittedly surprised to find 
such a socially minded, compassionate group of individuals. Fortunately, they 
brought these values into discussion without prompting, so this was not lost in the 
analysis. 
Finally, my own values have inevitably shaped the research. Having trained in 
clinical psychology, I do not relate to medicalised views on distress; and 
unsurprisingly, take the psychological perspective that distress is understandable, 
and rooted in a sociocultural context. Whilst I have attempted to consider other 
perspectives in my analysis and make these transparent, another researcher, with 
less critical views on diagnosis services, would perhaps have interpreted the data 
differently. For example, they may have been less likely to interpret paternalism 
(certainly, the literature on liaison and diversion schemes does not appear to 
consider this). Thus, the reader should be aware that I am primarily oriented towards 
values of respect and autonomy, which has likely guided my analysis, and influenced 
my interpretation 
Personal reflexivity also relates to the impact of the work on the researcher. The 
reader is directed to the section Reflections (pg. 91) for some thoughts on this. 
 METHODOLOGICAL REFLEXIVITY 
The research question, design and analysis will have had some influence over the 
study outcomes. My rudimentary understanding of the law (and its relation to mental 
health), and lack of previous literature to consult, meant the research was truly 
exploratory and informed by a broad research question. This has produced a number 
of outcomes; and whilst I hope that depth has not been overly sacrificed in the 
interests of breadth, future research could employ more targeted questions, and 
explore some of these issues further. The semi structured interviews felt very 
appropriate for an interviewer who did not know what she did not know, and 
participants who were very willing to talk (the impact of specific questions is 
                                            
17 A particularly memorable quote in one qualitative study involved a male barrister referring to female 
clerks thus: “They’re all slappers . . .  [flirting] always works. A wink and a smile and chat go very long 
way!” (Harris, 2002) 
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discussed below).  However, quantitative methodologies might be usefully employed 
in the future, to get more of a sense of the whole of the target population. Finally, 
thematic analysis allowed the collation and interpretation of a number of themes in 
the data. Grounded theory might offer a useful alternative analytical model, as it 
would allow e.g. theory of the barristers’ legal defence strategy to be developed 
(Willig, 2013). 
 THE IMPACT OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: THE TRAP OF LANGUAGE 
This research set out to explore how barristers explain and construct psychological 
distress, in a way that was as value free as possible. The title and information sheet 
for the study used the term, “psychological distress,” as it felt most concordant with 
my conceptualisations of distress as a continuum, and away from the medicalised 
language of, “mental health.” However, in constructing the interview schedule, a pilot 
interview was held, and it seemed that this terminology was confusing to the 
participant, and made it more difficult to get an understanding of their experiences. It 
was therefore decided to use the term “mental health” for pragmatic reasons, as it 
apparently led quickly to a shared understanding, and was perhaps received in a 
less confronting way, as a lay term that was commonly understood. 
However, a lay term in fact comes with a host of assumptions that have been 
created by the society in which it derived. As hinted above, “mental health” suggests 
a parity with physical health, an illness metaphor, of a categorical nature: you either 
have mental health difficulties, or you do not (Bentall, 2009). The interview questions 
therefore framed our discussions within this metaphor, which may have closed down 
alternative conceptualisations of distress (e.g. that it is a human reaction to adverse 
life circumstances, rather than an illness caused by biological mechanisms). It is 
possible that less medicalised narratives may have been elicited from the 
participants had I introduced different terminology. Equally, those sharing a more 
contextualised account of distress may have spoken more freely of this. Whilst I tried 
to be mindful of this when conducting the analysis, the reader should also take this 
into account when drawing their own conclusions. 
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 IMPACT AND IMPORTANCE 
As the first piece of qualitative research to investigate how barristers work with 
psychological distress, this thesis offers novel findings. Moreover, the findings have 
significant implications. As has been argued, many of those in the MC will be 
experiencing mental health issues; these individuals’ ability to participate in the trial, 
and final outcome, is mediated by how barristers construct and identify distress, and 
how this informs their defence strategy. This thesis has suggested that these 
individuals’ human right to a fair trial may be violated, due to the pressures upon, 
and inadequate training offered to, barristers. Furthermore, this research suggests 
that this combination of high workload, role conflict, and poor resources; alongside a 
professional socialisation that discourages emotional support, places barristers at 
high risk of burnout. It is hoped that this thesis stimulates further research, and can 
be used to advocate for emotional support for barristers, and the rights of their 
clients. 
A note on the systemic issues identified by barristers (e.g. courtroom stigma). These 
are hugely significant for clients with mental health difficulties, but an investigation of 
this was not the focus of this research. Thus, whilst important, the impact of this 
finding (within the context of this thesis) is limited; further research is needed to 
investigate these issues, and effect change.   
 LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of this research are summarised as follows: 
My lack of familiarity with the legal world may have limited my ability to make 
contextual interpretations. Further research may consider working cross-
professionally, consulting with legal professionals to inform the research. 
A lack of previous research on the topic, my inexperience in law, and the broad 
research aims mean saturation may not have been reached. There is therefore 
potentially more to be discovered on the topic, and more research is needed. 
Interview questions used the phrase “mental health,” thus introducing a medical 
construct, which may have influenced responses, potentially eliciting more 
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medicalised perspectives. Furthermore, some questions were close-ended. Although 
this did not appear to limit the participants’ responses, it is possible that open ended 
questions may have generated further data. 
The “social desirability bias (Fisher, 1993)”18 may mean that unethical conduct by 
participants was not reported. It is my view that this was not the case for these 
participants, but should further research investigate this more fully, it would be 
advisable to consider means of addressing this, for example, anonymous online 
questionnaires. 
Selection bias has potentially influenced this study, due to convenience sampling 
and self-selection of those who were most interested in the topic; however, not to the 
point of negating the claims made. It would be useful to use representative sampling 
in future research, or target barristers who are less informed about mental health.   
 Whilst the analysis suggests barristers have significant risk factors for developing 
burnout, this was a surprise finding, and interview questions were not directed at 
examining these experiences. Therefore, claims cannot be made about the 
prevalence or severity of barristers’ psychological distress. Whilst professional 
socialisation is proposed as a mediating factor, this is an interpretation of collected 
data rather than the isolation and modelling of risk factors that would be better 
explored using quantitative research methods. Arguably, there is some benefit in not 
quantifying and individualising distress in this way, as the focus shifts from 
necessary systemic changes to the treatment of pathologised individuals19. However, 
evidence as to the incidence of barristers’ distress would be helpful in advocating for 
change, and more research is needed to establish this. 
                                            
18 The tendency for research participants to report socially desirable, rather than accurate, behaviours 
(Fisher, 1993). 
19 For a nice example of this, Australian researchers found that extremely overworked lawyers went 
onto develop burnout; and proposed “over commitment” as a mediating variable, recommending that 
lawyers should monitors themselves for signs of over commitment, and seek help to prevent this - 
rather than advocate for systemic change to reduce workload (Bergin & Jimmieson, 2013). 
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Equally, whilst the systemic issues reported by participants are troubling (e.g. 
Magistrates holding stigmatised attitudes), this was not the focus of this research, 
and more research is needed before claims can be made about this. 
This research did not include the voice of the clients themselves, which would have 
been useful of for triangulation the data, and may provide an important perspective in 
future research. 
4.3 REFLECTIONS 
Whilst completing this research, I have been working on an inpatient psychiatric 
ward that uses sections and community treatment orders extensively. It is arguably 
the other side of the coin to that described by the study participants, with patients 
medicalised, rather than criminalised. Szasz’ work (Ennis & Szasz, 1972) has 
provided a vocabulary for my deep-seated uneasiness at the level of coercion I 
witness, and am perhaps complicit in, by virtue of not opposing it.  I agree that 
honesty and transparency is of paramount importance, and that labelling deviance 
as illness obscures whose best interests are really being acted upon; i.e., the public 
are being protected, rather than the patient “treated.” Yet, the alternative process of 
criminalisation described by the participants, from my perspective, only offers more 
punishment to vulnerable people.  
I have been left with more questions than answers. I am not hopeful that the current 
interest in CJS reform is likely to step much outside of this unsatisfactory mad or 
bad, medicalise or criminalise, paradigm. I am, at least, exceptionally careful in my 
own use of language with clients, and questioning of other professionals; neither of 
which serve to change much beyond my own sphere of influence. Ultimately, I would 
argue what is needed is a more just, and equal society. Both distress and criminal 
acts are rooted in social inequalities, and this research has confirmed my belief that 
psychologists have a role in advocating for a fairer society. We are also, consciously 
or otherwise, always part of systems that present sometimes unfathomable ethical 
dilemmas. I am grateful that I have at least reflected upon these, even if potential 
solutions remain distant.   
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4.4 SUMMARY 
This exploratory study has produced a number of interesting findings. Participants 
constructed mental health in a variety of ways, apparently tending to occupy either 
more of a contextualising or medicalising position. Clients with mental health 
difficulties were particularly emotionally taxing, with participants unsure how to 
manage their distress. Ethical concerns were raised around the emotional well-being 
of barristers and their lack of training in mental health. Potentially the consequences 
of poor training included legal paternalism (subjugating the client’s autonomy in an 
attempt to act in their “best interests”), or non-identification of mental health needs 
leading to the deprivation of defence options. These may represent unintended 
human right violations. Under extreme stress, it is possible that barristers were at 
high risk of burnout; affecting not only their own psychological health, but potentially 
leading to financially-driven unethical behaviour towards their clients, with those with 
mental health needs particularly vulnerable. Clients with mental health difficulties 
were also named as at particular risk of wider discrimination and inequalities in the 
CJS. Systemic changes, informed by clinical psychology, were recommended.  
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
1) How long have you worked as a barrister and how many clients have you 
seen? 
2) How many clients have you worked with who you’ve thought were 
experiencing mental health difficulties? 
3) Have you had any specific training in mental health?  
- For example, as part of your training, have you been told how best 
to respond if someone seems to have a mental health condition? 
4) What sort of training would you like to have in mental health (if any?) 
5) What sort of things would you consider to be mental health conditions?  
- (Prompt if necessary) What about personality disorder? 
6) How do you go about assessing fitness to plead? 
7) If you suspect your client has mental health needs, how would you raise 
this with them? 
8) To what extent do you think mental health difficulties lead to your clients 
being arrested? 
9) How do you feel about the outcome of the court case for [the clients you 
mentioned earlier]? 
- Do you feel like you’ve made a difference? 
- How are you left feeling? 
 
Extra prompt question if no specific examples are given (to follow question 8): 
1) Could you give me an example of someone you’ve worked with? 
- What was your role? 
- What impact did their mental health have on your work? 
- Did you liaise with anyone else? 
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
Int: and then so of those clients, how many do you think may  
have been experiencing some kind of mental health difficulty? 
 
Max: it’s really hard to say because it’s a, a very stressful and  
pressured time, and often in the Magistrate’s Court as well you  
tend to find people when they’re at their most stressed  
because they erm they’ve only just been remanded in custody  
<mmhmm> probably the night before by the police, they’re  
arrested that night before <yeah> they are then interviewed at  
the police station and put court after being charged, so people  
are at a very heightened <yeah> state of erm, what’s the word  
I’m looking for, distress <mmhmm> because they’re not used  
to the fact that they’ve just been effectively incarcerated  
<mmhmm> and been reminded into custody, erm so it’s it’s  
hard, I have to say, officially I think is a tiny percentage that  
had erm during the trial process or the court process, their  
mental health issue was part of the court process. I’d probably  
maybe say, under 10% <mmhmm> where it actually becomes  
an issue in either their trial sentence erm 
 
Int: do you mean in, in respect of that would have been, erm in  
some way interfering with, with the process, or been submitted  
as some kind of evidence within that? 
 
Max: yes, absolutely. So either erm, it plays a part in the trial  
because their mental health effects the /<yeah>/ offence that  
they’ve been charged with and how the court determines  
whether or not they’re guilty <yeah> erm, or in terms of  
sentence they have such a severe mental health issue that  
there’s erm, and actual intervention that is needed in the  
courts <mmhmm> in terms of the mental health treatments  
<mmhmm> beyond that I would say at least in my view, at  
least the next 40% also have experienced mental health, have  
some form of mental health problem <mmhmm> maybe not  
diagnosed, recognised mental health disorder <mmhmm> which  
is where the courts tend to draw the line <mmhmm> they tend  
to only intervene or accept evidence when there is a  
recognised, <mmhmm> diagnosed mental health disorder, so  
someone with ADHD or schizophrenia or autism, something  
like that where it’s got a doctor who signed, sealed, stamped a  
report and says this guy has got a recognised mental health  
problem, is actually only about 10%, then the next 40%  
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<mmhmm> either through alcohol, drugs, stress, pressure,  
horrific circumstances that they live under <yeah> have got  
some sort of, when you talk to them, they have some  
recognisable problem <mmhmm> they’re not quite right, but  
they’re not diagnosed with anything <mmhmm> either because  
they don’t want to be, or because I often find a lot of them have  
sort of personality issue <mmhmm> personality disorder, but  
not recognised. So it’s somewhere in that spectrum  
<mmhmm>, but it’s not, it’s not enough for there to be  
intervention <mmhmm> or, or diagnosed so <mmhmm> in total  
at least half my clients, and then beyond that then it’s, it’s at  
least 50 to 60% that I think <okay> have got some sort of issue  
 
Int: yeah yeah and you said that, that’s erm for, for a much  
smaller percentage of these clients, about 10% erm it might  
come into the trial in some way, and one of the ways that it  
could be erm brought into the trial would be assessing their  
guilt, because of the nature of their mental health difficulty  
<yeah yeah> could you give me an example of that? 
 
Max: of course erm, so there are certain crimes, it’s called  
specific intent <mmhmm> so certain crimes can only be  
committed if they have <mmhmm> a specific intent which  
means that you can’t do it by reckless, a reckless act, so for  
example a common assault <mmhmm> which is the most  
basic form of assault, can either be committed in a reckless  
way <mmhmm> i.e. they didn’t mean to hurt the person, but  
the way they behaved would have been reasonably  
foreseeable that their actions would have caused harm to  
somebody else….(continued)   
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APPENDIX C: INFORMATION SHEET 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
School of Psychology 
Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
 
 
The Principal Investigator: Lynsey Kelly, Email: xxx, Tel: XX 
 
Consent to participate in a Research Study, “How do Criminal Defence Barristers 
Work with Psychological Distress Throughout the Courtroom Process?” 
 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to 
consider in deciding whether to participate a research study. The study is being 
conducted as part of my Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at the University 
of East London. 
 
Why am I being asked to take part? 
We know that many defendants in the criminal justice system have some degree of 
psychological distress or mental health problem. There is not much research, however, 
on how criminal defence lawyers work with these individuals. This study aims to 
explore how lawyers work with defendants throughout the courtroom process. This will 
include: lawyers’ knowledge and experience of mental health, what happens during the 
trial, and what lawyers think about the verdicts and outcomes for these individuals.  
 
I am inviting criminal defence barristers or solicitors who have worked in a Magistrates’ 
Court to take part in these interviews. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
 
If you decide to participate in this study, I will meet with you for one interview, which will 
take between 45-60 minutes. This will be audio-recorded so that I can analyse the data 
afterwards. It will take place in a private room, which can either be at the university, at 
your place of work, or at your home. Alternatively they can take place over Skype. After 
the interview there will be a chance to discuss your experience and ask questions.   
 
What are the risks and benefits of taking part? 
 
I do not anticipate any particular risks or disadvantages to taking part in this research, 
beyond making the time to do so. Questions are not expected to be of a particularly 
upsetting or personal nature. However, should you find the process distressing, there 
will be time to debrief at the end of the interview. You can also talk confidentially to The 
Samaritans, on 08457 90 90 90.  
 
I cannot offer you any specific compensation for taking part. Benefits of taking part of 
the study, however, include contributing to the understanding of people with mental 
health conditions in the courtroom process. By taking part you may help to improve 
services for these individuals.  
 
What will happen to my data? 
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After the interview, the audio recording will be transferred onto a computer, and the 
recording on the Dictaphone will be destroyed. The recording will be transcribed into an 
anonymised electronic document. The computer holding the audio recording and the 
electronic transcripts will be password protected. The audio file will be kept until the 
end of the study (May 2015) and the electronic transcripts for a further three years 
(May 2018), after which they will be destroyed. The same process will apply for Skype 
interviews. 
 
Where and when will the interviews take place? 
 
The interview will take place at a time and place convenient to you, and is expected to 
last between 45-60 minutes. I can meet with you at University of East London, which is 
based in Stratford. If you prefer and you have a private room that we can use, I can 
meet with you at your place of work, or your home. I can also conduct interviews over 
Skype. 
 
Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study and should not feel coerced. You are free 
to withdraw at any time. Should you choose to withdraw from the study you may do so 
without disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to give a reason. Should 
you withdraw, I reserve the right to use your anonymised data in the write-up of the 
study and any further analysis.  
 
Please feel free to ask me any questions. If you are happy to continue you will be 
asked to sign a consent form prior to your participation. Please retain this invitation 
letter for reference.  
What if I have any questions or concerns about how the study has been 
conducted? 
 
Please contact the study’s supervisor:  
Lara Frumkin, School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London 
E15 4LZ 
(Tel: 020 8223 4352, Email: L.frumkin@uel.ac.uk)  
 
Or  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee:  
Dr. Mark Finn, School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London 
E15 4LZ. 
(Tel: 020 8223 4493. Email: m.finn@uel.ac.uk) 
 
Thank you in anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Lynsey Kelly, 26.06.14 
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APPENDIX D: CONSENT FORM 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
Consent to participate in a research study  
 
How do Criminal Defence Barristers Work with Psychological Distress 
Throughout the Courtroom Process? 
 
I have the read the information sheet relating to the above research study and have 
been given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been 
explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask 
questions about this information. I understand what is being proposed and the 
procedures in which I will be involved have been explained to me. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, 
will remain strictly confidential. Only the researcher(s) involved in the study will have 
access to identifying data. It has been explained to me what will happen once the 
research study has been completed. 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully 
explained to me. Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without disadvantage to myself and without being 
obliged to give any reason. I also understand that should I withdraw, the researcher 
reserves the right to use my anonymous data in the write-up of the study and in any 
further analysis that may be conducted by the researcher. 
 
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Participant’s Signature  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher’s Signature  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Date: ……………………..……. 
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APPENDIX E: ETHICAL APPROVAL 
ETHICAL PRACTICE CHECKLIST (Professional Doctorates) 
 
SUPERVISOR:   Lara Frumkin  ASSESSOR: Ashok Jansari 
 
STUDENT: Lynsey Kelly  DATE (sent to assessor): 18/02/2014 
 
Proposed research topic: How do Criminal Defence Barristers Work with Psychological Distress 
Throughout the Courtroom Process? 
 
Course: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
1.   Will free and informed consent of participants be obtained?  YES  
 
2.   If there is any deception is it justified?     N/A  
           
3.   Will information obtained remain confidential?     YES 
      
4.   Will participants be made aware of their right to withdraw at any time? YES  
 
5.   Will participants be adequately debriefed?    YES 
       
6.   If this study involves observation does it respect participants’ privacy? NA 
  
7.   If the proposal involves participants whose free and informed 
      consent may be in question (e.g. for reasons of age, mental or 
      emotional incapacity), are they treated ethically?   NA 
    
8.   Is procedure that might cause distress to participants ethical?  NA 
 
9.   If there are inducements to take part in the project is this ethical? NA 
    
10. If there are any other ethical issues involved, are they a problem? NA  
 
APPROVED   
  
YES 
      
 
MINOR CONDITIONS:   
 
 
 
REASONS FOR NON APPROVAL:  
 
 
Assessor initials:   AJ Date:  22nd February 2014 
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RESEARCHER RISK ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST (BSc/MSc/MA) 
 
SUPERVISOR:   Lara Frumkin  ASSESSOR: Ashok Jansari 
 
STUDENT: Lynsey Kelly  DATE (sent to assessor): 18/02/2014 
 
Proposed research topic: How do Criminal Defence Barristers Work with Psychological Distress 
Throughout the Courtroom Process? 
 
Course: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
 
Would the proposed project expose the researcher to any of the following kinds of 
hazard? 
 
 
1 Emotional   YES / NO 
 
 
2. Physical   YES / NO 
 
 
3. Other    YES / NO 
 (e.g. health & safety issues) 
 
 
If you’ve answered YES to any of the above please estimate the chance of the 
researcher being harmed as:      HIGH / MED / LOW  
 
 
APPROVED   
  
YES 
      
 
MINOR CONDITIONS:   
 
 
 
REASONS FOR NON APPROVAL:  
 
 
 
 
Assessor initials:  AJ   Date:  22nd February 2014 
 
 
 
For the attention of the assessor: Please return the completed checklists by e-mail to 
ethics.applications@uel.ac.uk within 1 week. 
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APPENDIX F: TRANSCRIPTION SCHEME, AND ADDITIONAL ALTERATIONS 
MADE TO QUOTES  
(.) Pause 
(2) Two second pause 
[Word] Words inserted by researcher to aid understanding (e.g. [Barristers] 
substituted for [We])  
[…] Omitted Word  
[inaudible] Inaudible section of transcript 
 [laughter] Laughter during the interview 
<Words> Brief interruption by second speaker 
/Words/ Overlapping talk  
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APPENDIX G: PHASES OF THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
Table 3: Braun & Clarke’s (2006, pp 35) Phases of Thematic Analysis 
 
Phase Description 
1. Familiarising 
yourself with 
your data 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and 
rereading the data, noting down initial ideas. 
 
2. Generating initial 
codes 
Coding interesting features of the data in a 
systematic fashion across the entire data set, 
collating data relevant to each code. 
 
3. Searching for 
themes 
Collating codes into potential themes, gathering 
all data relevant to each potential theme. 
4. Reviewing 
themes 
Checking in the themes work in relation to the 
coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set 
(Level 2), generating a “thematic map‟ of the 
analysis. 
 
5. Defining and 
naming themes 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each 
theme, and the overall story the analysis tells; 
generating clear definitions and names for each 
theme. 
 
6. Producing the 
report 
The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of 
vivid, compelling extract examples, final 
analysis of selected extracts, relating back of 
the analysis to the research question and 
literature, producing a scholarly report of the 
analysis 
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APPENDIX H: EXAMPLE NOTES ON THEMES 
(See next page for typed up version) 
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Typed version of previous page: 
Pt 4 
70- Vulnerability of defence overlooked – proper support not provided (and 
therefore falling to the lawyer). Lawyers making up the the inadequacies of the 
MC when dealing with distress 
84- Fitness to plead is worst [option], so instead run the trial with more care 
135- The unsayable/ risks of disclosing to the court 
Impossible dilemmas – unfit to plead as not being at all useful as a defence 
strategy, “you’ve basically folded” 
172 – Court proceedings as damaging in their own right 
237- Difficulties fitting in to generalised legal training 
250- Overwhelming sense of responsibility for vulnerable clients 
278- Unfairness 
Risk assessment: if very erratic, might disclose to the court  
Barrister’s safety 
Lack of payment 
452- Criminal lawyers as those with a social conscience. Joint role: welfare / 
social work 
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APPENDIX I: EXAMPLE CODING  
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Magnified codes:
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APPENDIX J: FINAL LIST OF CODES  
  
  
  
  
4.4.4.1  
1. ability to seek advice makes manageable 
2. acquittal not necessarily a good outcome 
3. act on best interests even if this overrides autonomy 
4. act on instructions 
5. acting against one's own values 
6. Acting unethically due to financial pressures 
7. advice offered, but not emotional support 
8. alone 
9. always raise with them first 
10. anger is distress 
11. angry 
12. anxiety and depression can be equally  
serious 
13. appropriate adult changes the relationship 
14. as advocate, should be willing to put 
 in extra work 
15. as less severe than MH 
16. asking about past mental health issues  
if think is a problem 
17. assess situation first 
18. assessment of costs and benefits 
19. associated with anger 
20. assumes responsibility  
21. assuming responsibility versus supporting autonomy 
22. avoid disclosing MH as may bias magistrate 
23. awareness of stigma 
24. Barrister occupy a similarly ambivalent position 
25. barristers 
26. barristers acting unethically for financial reasons 
27. barristers as holding some responsibility for people with MH 
28. barristers can undermine autonomy 
29. Barristers' Distress 
30. barristers emotional distress 
31.  
32. barristers holding responsibility 
33. barristers likely to hold prejudice 
34. barristers make the initial decision to 
 refer 
 
35. barristers role - a good but fair outcome 
36. barristers role – present the case in the form 
 that  
they want you to 37. barristers role – respect clients autonomy 
38. barristers role - to concentrate resources  
on the legal issues 
39. barristers role to act on best interests 
40. barristers unable to take up services 
 due to stigma 
41. barristers use their common sense as a  
proxy for training 
42. barristers value other things more highly 
 them being paid 
43. barristers working outside their competence 
44. barristers would not be the first person 
 to notice 
45. bearer of bad news 
46. behaviour in court may undermine defence 
47. benefits of identifying MH 
48. better to run trial than use FTP 
49. bias against the defendant 
50. broken 
51. build relationship first 
52. can be unFTP but not covered by MHA 
53. can make adjustments 
54. can't cope 
55. categorical model 
56. CJS as perpetuating shame 
57. CJS as proxy community care 
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58. CJS making people worse 
59. Clash of Imprecise Diagnosis with the 
 Precise Legal System 
60. clash of views on reality 
61. client is likely to be very distressed 
62. clients may not understand 
63. clients may not wish to disclose MH 
64. clients wishing to talk about their MH 
65. coded language 
66. concerns about training 
67. conflict between obligation to client & court 
68. conflicting feelings 
69. conflicting feelings (2) 
70. consequences of diagnosis 
71. consideration of defendants’ welfare detracts  
from the legal issues 
72. consideration of impact of being antisocial on wider society 
73. considers consequences of diagnosis 
74. considers running trial rather than using  
FTP as breaking rules 
75. constructions of mental health 
76. coping 
77. costs 
78. court generally not prejudicial or stigmatising 
79. court staff also have a difficult job 
80. courtroom  & cjs prejudice & ignorance 
81. courtroom not having relevant information on MH 
82. criminal responsibility and culpability 
83. Criminalisation 
84. criminalisation associated with social  
disadvantage 
85. culture of disbelief 
86. damage to defence 
87. damned if you do damned if you don't 
88. dealing with aggression 
89. dealing with aggression as a female 
90. dealing with distress 
91. dealing with multiple people 
92. defendants vulnerability overlooked 
93. demonstrates a lack of faith in client 
94. despair 
95. despondency 
96. diagnosis as  imprecise 
97. diagnosis as diagnosis, not reifying 
98. diagnosis as impressionistic 
99. diagnosis as pivotal, reifying 
100. diagnosis needed to be recognised  
by the court 
101. diagnosis required for provision of support 
102. diff to distinguish from LD 
103. different view on reality as most concerning 
104. difficult decisions by court 
105. difficult gaining instructions 
106. difficult if did not have criminal pupillage 
107. difficulties in making causal links for MH 
108. difficulties managing disruptive behaviour 
109. difficulties with fitness to plead 
110. difficulties working with client who is  
withdrawing 
111. difficulty of the job not recognised by court 
112. dignity 
113. dilemma about what to do 
114. directly suggest they may need to 
 see a doctor 
115. disempowered 
116. district judges are better 
117. distress in court 
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118. distress is a normal reaction to the  
stress of the  
courtroom 119. distress not recognised by professional 
 body 
120. distress of the trial may be magnified by MH issues 
121. does MH or crime come first 
122. doesn't consider costs 
123. doing the job out of empathy 
124. don't know what to do 
125. double bind 
126. double bind (2) 
127. duty of care beyond trial 
128. duty of care to public 
129. easier to get support for the most 
 obvious issues 
130. emotional resources 
131. end up with no representation at all 
132. engagement and the relationship 
133. engagement with MHS is positive 
134. equates MH to illness and disability 
135. Ethical Dilemma 
136. Ethical Dilemma (Associated) Ill Resourced 
137. ethics of working w risk if untrained 
138. exhausted 
139. expects could find out what to do from guidelines or others, without training 
140. extreme cases can provide a defence 
141. facilitating participation 
142. fear 
143. fear and concern 
144. fear of damaging relationship 
145. fear of violence 
146. feeling blamed 
147. feeling complicit 
148. feeling responsible 
149. feeling sad when client disappointed despite best efforts 
150. feeling sorry for 
151. feeling unsure 
152. feels confident to deal with MH 
153. feels it is their responsibility to look  
out for MH 
154. financial pressure 
155. for a first appearance, go to Crown Court, 
 or enter not guilty 
156. formal support should be provided for 
 traumatic cases 
157. forms of mental health 
158. frames as non-expert yet takes expert position 
159. frames discussion in legal & process terms  
rather than human 
160. frames distress as anger 
161. ftp as discriminatory 
162. gentle exploration as direct q is risky 
163. get to court late 
164. giving instructions 
165. good outcomes 
166. good outcomes only possible with huge 
 amounts of work 
167. greater risk of not referring 
168. guide through process 
169.handle stress 
170. has related social issues, not in a vacuum 
171. have related substance use issues 
172. haven’t previously accessed due to social  
disadvantage 
173. help is dependent upon observable behaviour,  
or diagnosis 
174. helplessness 
175. hope it is noticed by the court 
176. horror 
177. Hospital orders no necessary a good 
 outcome 
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178. how it will impact on client, and thereby 
 the barrister 
179. how MH makes you particularly vulnerable 
180. humanity is missing 
181. ideally raise directly 
182. identification of MH risks over diagnosis 
 of client 
183. identification of MH risks professional 
 relationship 
184. identification of MH risks slowing 
 down the trial 
185. identification of MH risks slowing down the trial, and thereby  
     distressing the client 
186. if MH denied, could raise indirectly 
187. if not addressed, MH may prevent people  
from fully participating – in plea process 
188. if substance misuse 
189. if systemic issues addressed it'd mitigate their distress 
190. Ill Resourced  
191. Illusion of Confidence 
192. impaired ability to cope 
193. impasse 
194. implications 
195. implications of a lack of support – you 
 stop caring 
196. imprecision of dx reflected in barristers  
feeling of indecision 
197. improvement in support 
198. in the interests of the client 
199. inadequate support offered 
200. includes anxiety, stress, depression 
201. incremental criminalisation 
202. influence of ill resourced systems 
203. inherent trauma of the trial 
204. intermediary not available in the MC 
205. inviting and respecting client's view 
206. Junior barristers may not secure the best outcomes for MH clients 
207. knowledge of MH gathered from personal life 
208. knows best (c.f. paternalism) 
209. lack confidence 
210. lack of comprehension is frightening 
211. lack of consideration of stigma, prejudice 
212. lack of diagnosis makes you vulnerable 
213. lack of dignity and autonomy 
214. lack of expertise in MC 
215. lack of logic 
216. lack of money in Magistrate's Court 
217. lack of options for court when sentencing 
218. lack of professional guidance as a concern 
219. lack of support 
220. lack of support for junior barristers 
221. lack of training as a concern 
222. lack training or skills should therefore stick to  
legal issues only 
223. lawyer may not be believed by court 
224. LD as childlike 
225. learning on the job 
226. learning on the job instead of training 
227. learning on the job more important than 
 training 
228. legal advisor important 
229. length of experience 
230. less able to think through complex social issues 
231. less capable 
232. longer time efficiency overlook 
233. magistrates may hold prejudicial attitudes 
234. magistrates may be biased, can't just forget 
235. makes meaning out of MH experiences 
236. ma age client's distress 
237. managing abnormal behaviour 
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238. managing distress 
239. Managing impasses and suspiciousness 
240. many are untreated 
241. may be criminally responsible but not culpable 
242. may be punished unfairly 
243. may identify MH but instead handover to solicitor 
244. may lack resources to raise MH with the client 
245. may not wish to disclose 
246. May prevent them fully engaging with the trial 
247. may suffer undue stress 
248. may work harder as junior barrister 
249. MC less serious, but proportionately  
very important 
250. medical model 
251. mental health as a problem 
252. MH as causal in the arrest 
253. MH as pathological 
254. MH as risk factor for the offence, but not sole cause 
255. MH as serious 
256. MH as vulnerable 
257. MH cases take up more time, energy 
258. MH clients different, need a diff outlook 
259. MH defence requires a lot of work 
260. MH defence requiring huge amounts of work 
261. MH framed as a medical condition 
262. MH is something wrong with you 
263. MH issues relate to type of offence 
264. MH leading to difficulties in communication  
and understanding 
265. MH makes you less culpable 
266. MH may be unhelpful to trial outcome 
267. MH may bias the trial 
268. MH means not cut out for the job 
269. MH means you need looking after 
270. MH not always taken into account  
when sentencing 
271. MH or ASD as bad 
272. MH or LD as needing protection 
273. MH overrepresented 
274. MH used as mitigating factors for the  
sentencing 
275. mhs as social control 
276. mild or less obvious problems may provide 
 no defence 
277. mild problems most likely to be overlooked 
278. miss appointments 
279. Mitigating Harm and Managing Distress 
280. morality 
281. more severe or obvious problems May 
  provide a defence 
282. more time 
283. need for a big change, recognition of MH 
284. need for community care 
285. need for conviction to get services 
286. need for diversion 
287. need supervision 
288. need to admit a problem to receive support 
289. need to appear competent to survive 
290. negative talk about legal aid 
291. negative talk about police 
292. negative talk about solicitors 
293. never been a problem 
294. nice quotes 
295. no confidential environment 
296. no one cares 
297. no training for fitness to plead 
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298. no training in MH 
299. no training means things are missed 
300. non expert 
301. non medicalised view 
302. non-expert, therefore disempowered 
303. normalises 
304. not a barristers role to diagnose 
305. not considering negatives of ftp or disclosure 
306. not everyone is prepared to put in the time 
 to work intensive but low paying cases 
307. not getting paid for work 
308. not homogenous 
309. not making a big deal out of it, awareness 
 of stigma 
310. not raising MH due to fear of violence 
311. not stupid, just need different communication skills 
312. not their responsibility 
313. not to get an acquittal at all costs 
314. not wishing to admit they hold responsibility 
315. on engagement 
316. on the edges of society 
317. on whether or not to raise MH, best approach 
318. other professionals need training 
319. others don’t know how to deal 
320. outcomes 
321. outcomes in nobody's interest best interests 
322. overrepresented 
323. paternalistic 
324. people with LD acquiescing 
325. people with MH I generally still fit to plead 
326. people with MH needing more time 
327. person with MH viewed as object 
328. personality disorder as dangerous 
329. personality disorder as untreatable 
330. persuading client not to disclose MH 
331. pity 
332. police can be good if diagnosed 
333. poor experiences of MH services 
334. positioning self as non-expert 
335. possibility of overusing protection 
336. potential for naming MH  to improve 
 relationship 
337. potential signs of MH 
338. prejudice as a reason not to disclose 
339. preoccupied 
340. pressure on junior barristers 
341. Pressures 
342. pressures mean barristers have to reconsider  
what they can offer 
343. previous professional experience 
344. prison more aversive for those with MH 
345. problem with fused powers 
346. problematic if training led barristers to try 
 and diagnose clients 
347. problems caused by barristers' colluding 
348. problems defining mental health 
349. problems with CJS outcome data 
350. problems with profession - being junior 
351. Professional Anxiety 
352. Professional Anxiety (Associated) how MH 
 makes you particularly vulnerable 
353. proportion with mental health 
354. prosecution hold stigmatised attitudes 
355. prosecution's under use of public interest  
grounds 
356. protecting the relationship 
357. psychopathy as mysterious 
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358. psychosis is not understandable and 
 therefore frightening and difficult 
359. psychotic experiences as most serious 
360. punishment versus rehabilitation 
361. purpose of the CJS 
362. questioning of current MH dangerous 
363. raising directly has ended badly 
364. raising via court if safety issues 
365. rapport as crucial 
366. rescinds responsibility by taking a non-expert,  
helpless position 
367. Recognition of a  flawed system 
368. Recognition that MH may lead to difficulties 
 participating 
369. referrals can help with defence 
370. reification 
371. related to functioning 
372. relational 
373. relational resources 
374. respect for autonomy 
375. Responsibility 
376. risk to relationship 
377. risks autonomy and engagement 
378. risks client suffering prejudice 
379. risks of not identifying MH 
380. role as an advocate -  to emotionally support 
381. role as an advocate -  to emotionally support, engage,  
and form a good relationship 
382. sad 
383. sees role as about engaging fully 
384. sees role as to form a good relationship 
385. self-stigma 
386. self-care 
387. sensitivity to the fact the question is out of context 
388. services are more about temporary 
 prevention of harm  
than treatment 389. sexual offenders will not change 
390. should always investigate 
391. should be left to professionals 
392. sick 
393. slow  down trial 
394. social causes 
395. social control function 
396. social exclusion as causal in MH 
397. some distress is manageable,  
very abnormal behaviour 
is not 398. some with a social conscience 
399. sometimes make a difference 
400. specific successes 
401. spectrum, contextualised perspective 
402. stigma 
403. stigma - appreciation of wider societal issues 
404. stigma of being a defendant 
405. stigma within community leading to nondisclosure 
406. stigma, discrimination of being a defendant 
407. Strategies used 
408. strategy – get through day as quickly as quickly 
 as possible 
409. stress and competence 
410. stress of working very long hours 
411. stress on barristers may lead to worse 
 outcomes  
for clients 412. stressed, pressured 
413. struggling with emotional burden 
414. substance use doesn't count 
415. substance use is related 
416. substances as causal in offence 
417. substances as self-medication 
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418. support offered 
419. support worker as a positive 
420. supports autonomy  
421. suppressing clients wish to be saved 
422. survive emotionally by focusing solely on legal matters 
423. suspended sentences may not be helpful 
424. suspiciousness can damage relationship 
425. symptoms as manifest distress 
426. symptoms viewed as ways of coping 
427. Systemic Issues May Compromise Defence 
428. systemic resources 
429. take the flak on behalf of the client 
430. testing their thinking 
431. the CJS as proxy community care 
432. the unsayable 
433. there is a group that can’t be treated 
434. those with moderate problems may be  
in the most  difficult position 
435. those with skills are leaving the profession 
436. time and targets pressure 
437. time pressure means MH overlooked 
438. time pressure stresses out client 
439. to be better prepared for a flawed system 
440. to establish trust 
441. to financial pressures 
442. to help 
443. to help barristers manage emotional difficulties 
444. to identify more mild issues 
445. to make up for shortfalls of wider system 
446. to reassure, on their side 
447. to time pressure 
448. training 
449. training may be difficult to remember in  
practice 
450. training needed in prosecution to 
451. training would help barristers to look confident 
452. trauma as causal of MH 
453. traumatised 
454. trial process more important than trial outcome 
455. tries to resist social worker role 
456. tries to understand 
457. trying to avoid upsetting client 
458. trying to manage paranoid behaviour 
459. types of mental health problems 
460. ultimately comes down to the law 
461. unable to get to court 
462. unable to meet demands 
463. under stress from court 
464. underprepared 
465. under resourced diversion services  
don’t meet the need 
466. understand client is fully as possible 
 so can judge this 
467. unfairness 
468. unfamiliarity with personality disorders 
469. unfit to plead as undesirable 
470. unpredictable 
471. unreality of the courtroom 
472. unstable 
473. unsure how MH training might fit in 
474. unsure if aggression MH 
475. unsure of, couldn't identify 
476. unsure what to do as a junior barrister 
477. use of endorsements 
 
 
 
135 
 
478. use of indirect questions 
479. use of specific intent as a defence 
480. Using Mental Health As a Defence 
481. violates privileged confidential relationship 
482. vulnerable to time and financial pressures 
483. want to talk about social issues, not case 
484. weighing up the wider social benefits 
485. welfare officer, social worker 
486. welfare officer, social worker (2) 
487. what caused MH 
488. what if don’t give instructions 
489. where knowledge gathered from 
490. whilst maybe criminally responsible,  
defendants are also socially disadvantaged 
491. will generally follow advice 
492. willingness to engage in clients reality 
493. wish for CJS to help people 
494. wish for rehabilitation or community care that is not met 
495. wish for solicitors to have training 
496. wish for training 
497. wish for training around communication and 
 understanding 
498. wish for training around diagnoses 
499. wish for training around when to refer 
500. wish for training on dealing with distress 
501. wish for training on professional obligations 
502. wish for training on vulnerability not MM 
503. wish to save or be saved 
504. Working Within A Flawed System 
505. worrying 
506. would be better if profession was not split  
from solicitors 
507. would like training 
508. would like training to address engagement 
509. would seek advice if necessary re MH 
510. wouldn't ask about MH 
511. you only get one chance in the MC 
 
ASD: autistic spectrum disorder 
CJS: criminal justice system 
FTP: fitness to plead 
LD: learning disability 
MC, Mags: Magistrate’s Court 
MH: mental health, 
MHS: mental  health  services,   
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APPENDIX K:  EXAMPLE OF ORGANISATION OF CODES  
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APPENDIX L: INITIAL THEMATIC MAP 
 
 
 
